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ABSTRACT
This thesis identifies the specific characteristics of information aggregators, and
proposes nine business models appropriate for information aggregators. These nine
models are: advertising, brokerage, subscription, licensing, infomediary (information
intermediaries), referral/click-through, customized/personalized service, professional
service/consulting, and application service provider. The thesis then looks into
various companies who base their businesses on information aggregation and
analyzes the development of their business models in the context of competition. The
financial and social performances of these companies are studied and reasons are
explored. In the end, the thesis summarizes findings from case studies, lists the
widely used business models and the rarely used ones, and explores reasons for this
phenomenon.
The conclusion of this research is that information aggregation is a start point for a
company to develop differentiated product or services. Companies can develop into
an independent information aggregators; they can use information aggregation as a
platform; they can partner with aggregatees or customers to provide customized
information. Eventually, many will be integrated into end-to-end solutions, or
penetrate into traditional businesses by leveraging information aggregation.
The research can be used by companies who develop information aggregation
products or services. It can also be used to evaluate the viability of information
aggregation initiatives.
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Sloan School of Management
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1 Introduction
1.1 Information Aggregation Overview
Information aggregators are entities that collect information from a wide range of sources,
with or without prior arrangements, and add value by providing post-aggregation
services.' Usually information aggregators collect information from various sources, such
as the Internet, diverse databases, company websites, and results of searching engines.
Aggregation is not a new word in business world; we can say almost every company
somehow aggregates either product or service. Information aggregation is not a new
phenomenon, either. For example, real estate brochure aggregates all the on-market
homes in one area and presents it to potential buyers. However, the horizon of
information aggregation is largely changed due to the emergence and prosperity of the
Internet.
Using a recently popular information aggregator as an example, we can see the big
effects imposed by information aggregators on the industries they are in. Zillow presents
home information of more than 70 million homes nationwide 2. The company's website -
www.zillow.com, provides collected information of home facts, value estimation, historic
price, comparable homes, and a set of real estate tools. Best of all, the information is free
to all users - buyers, sellers, and agents. Zillow launched its website in February 2006.3
After the start of Zillow.com, a handful of sites cropped up offering similar services.
Within a month, even the giant Realtor.com had a new feature on its front page giving
consumers a starting point to assess their property values.4 Moreover, all the agents who
make money from owning home valuation information will have to face the competition
from Zillow, who offers the information for free, through a more convenient way - the
Internet.
Even search engine giant Google made some attempt at information aggregation on top
of its search result. In general, Google just plainly lists the search result of viewers'
interest, ordered by relevance, but without any further analysis. Scholar.google.com,
however, not only lists the original contents from other sources, but also presents
summary of the works of interest, such as number of versions and number of citations
(see Figure 1-1). In this way, actually Google does analyze and presents it to end users
and becomes an information aggregator to some degree.
1 S. Madnick, Seizing The Opportunity: Exploiting Web Aggregation, MIS Quarterly Executive 2002
2 www.Zillow.com, the data is as of April, 2007.
3 Zillow.com reveals venture, Knight-Ridder Tribune Business News: NA, February 08, 2006
4 Forget Gimmicks: Buyers Want Numbers, New York Times: 1, February 11, 2007.
Figure 1-1: Google Scholar Search
According to S. Madnick, information aggregators have following characteristics5 :
• Access Transparency - An aggregator appears to be a normal user to a data source -
simply accessing the information.
• Contextual Transparency - An aggregator resolves contextual differences so it can
make effective comparisons.
*.+ Analysis - Instead of simply presenting data as is, an aggregator uses post-
aggregation analysis to synthesize value-added information.
Information aggregations are usually initiated by lead users. According to E. Hippel, lead
users are those who have advanced needs which are not fulfilled by current market and
by inventing solution by themselves they can benefit.6 Many information aggregation
companies were started by their founders the same way lead users try to find the solution
for their own needs. For example, two founders of Zillow started real estate information
aggregation after they became frustrated trying to figure out the market value of homes
they were considering. 7 RedRoller.com, a website comparing various shipping carriers in
order for users to save money and time, was started by eBayer who does business on
eBay and wanted better shipping solutions. 8
1.2 Research Motivation
Almost every company is affected by information aggregation, by either being
aggregated or being an aggregator. With advanced information technology and
ubiquitous information source, it seems not hard to start a website to collect whatever
public information one is interested in. However, as many high-tech CEO alleged
"Achieving consistent sales results is the most difficult thing. Developing world-beating
technology has always been easier for us.9 " It's easier to create value, but harder to
5 S. Madnick, Seizing The Opportunity: Exploiting Web Aggregation, MIS Quarterly Executive 2002
6 E. Hippel, Democratizing Innovation, the MIT Press 2005
7 The mark of Zillow, Knight-Ridder Tribune Business News: NA, February 26, 2006
shttps://www.redroller.com/shippingcenter/home
9 A survey done by MIT Entrepreneurship Center, they surveyed hundreds of high-tech CEO's, most of
whom were engineers.
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capture value. In other words, it's easier to generate value to customers, but it's much
harder to capitalize the created values.
How did information aggregators start their business? What advantages and
disadvantages do they have? How do they perform in financial perspective? What
business models did they employ and whether they're successful? Compared with
traditional company and general e-commerce company, are there any unique aspects in
business models which information aggregators should be aware of and prepare for?
1.3 Research Scopes
Three criteria are used to clarify whether an entity is an information aggregator and
whether it's of interest to this thesis:
*:* The company has to deal with information, or at least the business differentiation or
leading part of the entity has to deal with information, instead of physical goods. In
special, the thesis is only interested in information aggregation using the Internet
technology; others, like newspaper, booklet, and etc are not in the scope of this thesis.
. At least part of the information has to come from outside of the entity itself. In this
way, we can say that this entity is an aggregator.
*. There must be derived value from the built-up information stack, which in turn,
requires that the aggregator has to find latent customer needs, using new technology
and viable business models to set up the frame, so that customer can benefit from
that.
The boundary between a traditional e-commerce company and an information aggregator
is very fuzzy. It's hard to totally exclude almost every company from information
aggregation. For any company with a website, there are hyperlinks which lead to an
outside resource, and thus the company becomes a simplified information aggregator. On
the other hand, very few information aggregators restricted their business in purely
collecting publicly available information. Some partnered with other companies; some
developed product other than information aggregation; still some other leverage their
information to get into traditional business. This thesis will focus on those companies
whose competitive advantages are in information aggregation and those who start their
businesses with information aggregation, but later develop different products/services.
For the second category, this thesis will mainly focus on their business development
phase in information aggregation.
Aggregators mainly fall into following categories: 10
*. Relationship Aggregation. Yodlee (www.yodlee.com) empowers its customers to
mange all their financial relationships.
10 The first two types are from S. Madnick, Seizing The Opportunity: Exploiting Web Aggregation, MIS
Quarterly Executive 2002
Figure 1-2: Relationship Aggregation
o:* Comparison Aggregation. Shopping (www.shopping.com) compares commodity
prices of various online storefronts.
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Figure 1-3: Comparison Aggregation
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o Relevance Aggregation. Zillow (www.zillow.com) integrates text information (street,
state, and zip code), satellite photo map, and real estate data (layout, sales data, and
general market trends). This kind of aggregation generally combines pertinent
information around one core value and allows user to do combined search of all the
layers of information.
Figure 1-4: Relevance Aggregation
1.4 Research Objectives
The overall objective of this thesis is to establish a business model framework which can
be used by information aggregators. The research can also be used to evaluate the
viability of information aggregation initiatives.
1.5 Research Approach
Business environments of information aggregators are very dynamic and ever evolving;
empirical observations and analysis of information aggregators in various industries are
adopted. The thesis will study three cases, in shipping, financial service, and real estate
industry separately. For each case study, its deployed business models are evaluated and
the path of business model evolvement is examined. Then, based on the proposed
business model framework, other suitable business models are suggested. Figure 1-5
illustrates the structure of each case study.
View: Street Aerial Hybrid O[]M Heat map
Street/,//'
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Figure 1-5: Research Approach
Information for case studies mainly comes from following resources: E-Business journal,
industry analysis report, commercial business databases, company website, and financial
report from public companies.
1.6 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 first reviews research done in information aggregation; then analyzes the
distinct characteristics of information aggregators and the value proposition they provide
to their service recipients. Based on that, a list of business models suitable for
information aggregators is suggested. The chapter is concluded with an analysis of
attractiveness of the information aggregation by using Five Force's methodology.
Chapters 3 through 5 present three case studies of information aggregators from various
industries - shipping, financial, and real estate. In each case study, the aggregatee
industry is analyzed; one or more aggregators are examined in detail regarding their
aggregation initiatives, revenue model, and the evolvement of their models. Also, other
aggregators are gone through briefly in order to present the competition horizon. Even
further, competitors other than aggregators are examined in order to present a complete
picture. Finally, each case is examined against the business models proposed in Chapter 2,
and those models they didn't adopt but might be practicable in their case are
recommended.
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings in the case studies, revisits the business models
proposed in chapter 2, and analyzes the reasons why some models are widely used and
some are rarely used. The chapter concludes with the prediction of information
aggregator development.
Other Feasible
Business Models
2 Business Model Analysis
2.1 Business Models Framework
Much research has been done about Internet and e-commerce business models, in both
academia and industry. Since e-business environment is very dynamic and always
evolving, most of the research summarized business models from empirical observation
and analysis. Table 2-111 lists some widely cited classifications of Internet business
models.
Table 2-1: Internet Business Models
Michael Rappa
(2000)
From observation of
internet commerce
trends
Anajana C. S.
(2001)
Paul Bambury
(1998)
6
6
* Brokerage
* Advertising
* Infomediary
* Merchant
* Manufacturer (Direct)
* Affiliate
* Community
* Subscription
* Utility
* Advertising - banner and direct marketing
* Subscription sites
* Customer services
* Directory services
* Content providers
* Product sales
* Freeware Model
* Library Model
* Information Barter
" http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html#Infomediary
http://www.stvlusinc.com/website/business models.htm
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue3 10/bamburv/index.html
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue8 6/wang/index.html
http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0072511664/student view0/chapter6/chapter outline.html
Sugato Bagchi and Bill Tulskie, e-business Models: Integrating Learning from Strategy Development
Experiences and Empirical Research, 20th Annual International Conference of the Strategic Management
Society, Vancouver, October 15-18, 2000
* Access Provision
* Web Site Hosting & Other Internet Services
* Digital Products & The Digital Delivery Model
Thomas Eisenmann 8 * Online Retailers
(2002) * Online Portals
* Internet Access Providers
* Online Content Providers
* Application Service Providers
* Online Brokers
* Online Market Makers
* Networked Utility Providers
Afuah 7 * Commission-Based
& * Advertising-Based
Ch. Tucci * Markup-Based
(2000) * Production-Based
* Referral-Based
* Subscription-Based
* Fee-for-Service-Based
Sugato Bagchi 7 * Online information exchange
& * Electronic execution and delivery of services
Bill Tulskie * Customized (or personalized) services
(2000) * Resource pooling
* Business intelligence
e-business building * Online collaboration
blocks from b Offering aggregation
empirical analysis of
over 600 e-business
initiatives worldwide
Peter Weil 8 * Content Provider
& * Direct to Customer
Michael R. Vitale * Full-Service Provider
(2001) * Intermediary
* Shared Infrastructure
* Value Net Integrator
* Virtual Community
* Whole-of-Enterprise/Government
Some of the above listed business models can directly generate revenue, such as
advertising, brokerage and web site hosting. However, many others are actually ways to
build up brand name or increase customer base so that companies can apply other
revenue models on top of that. Freeware model, third party marketplace, and virtual
communities are in this category.
Most of the taxonomies are for general Internet business models. In order to find out what
business models are applicable to information aggregators, we need to revisit the
definition of information aggregators in Chapter 1. Information aggregators are entities
that collect information from a wide range of web sources and other sources, with or
without prior arrangements, and add value by providing post-aggregation services. From
the definition, we know that information aggregator has following characteristics. 12
+ Transparency
. Retrieve publicly available information
* Multi-source information
* Analysis
On the other hand, information aggregators don't have following characteristics.
o Not provide source information by itself
: Not involved in physical product transaction
In his popular book Place to Space, Peter Weil points out that generally corporations own
part or all of three customer assets. 13 Relationship with customers gives firm power of
influence; customer data gives firm insight; and transaction generates revenue for firm.
So what assets do information aggregators have? According to the definition, information
aggregators collect information from various sources, organize it, and present it to end
customers. They serve as the primary interfaces to end customers by selectively choosing
source information and by influencing the end uses' choice. In this sense, we can say that
information aggregators own the relationships with customers. Some information
aggregators even own part of the customer data. For example, a financial account
aggregator knows what accounts a customer hold and the amount in each account.
Owning customer accounts data gives the aggregator insight on where the customer
stands in financial perspective and what products/services might interest the customer.
Traditionally revenue comes from transaction, be it purchase/sell, lending/borrowing, or
many others; this imposes a big challenge on revenue models of information aggregators.
How can they make money from owning customer relationship and customer data? To
answer this question, we need to look at the values provided by information aggregators.
Generally, information aggregators provide following value propositions to their service
recipients.
+ Increased diversity of information
o Broader service availability
* Improved searching ability and reduced searching cost
+ Comparison between alternative choices
12 S. Madnick, Seizing The Opportunity: Exploiting Web Aggregation, MIS Quarterly Executive 2002
13Peter Weill, Michael Vitale, Place to Space, Harvard Business School Press
: Better customized to user wants and needs
+ Reduced transaction time
Based on above analysis, several criteria are chosen to pick up relevant business models
for information aggregators. They are as following:
*- The business model shouldn't require major infrastructure investment except that the
investment is related to information aggregation. According to this, we can exclude
internet access providers.
* The business model should be self-sufficient, instead of be supplementary to existing
product/service system. According to this, we can exclude merchant, manufacturer
(direct), customer services, content providers, product sales, freeware model, digital
products & the digital delivery model, online retailers, business intelligence, and
online collaboration.
*- The business model has to be based on retrieving multi-source information and
providing value-added post-aggregation analysis. According to this, we can exclude
online portals, library model, and resource pooling.
After excluding irrelevant business models, and combining the rest, the author believes
following business models are appropriate for information aggregators.
* Advertising - an extension of traditional media broadcast model. An information
aggregator provides text or banner ads for various businesses and charges them per
view or per click.
o Brokerage - bringing together buyers and sellers and facilitate transactions. Broker
charges fees or commissions per transaction it enables.
• Subscription - fee for service/content model. Subscription fee can be periodic - daily,
monthly, or annual. Usually information aggregators combine free service with
premium services that requires subscription.
. Licensing - the sale of a product that involves only the transfer of usage rights to the
buyer, in accordance with a "terms of use" agreement. 14 It is widely used regarding
software products.
o Infomediary (information intermediaries) - an information aggregator has collective
data. It can assist buyers and/or sellers understand a given market by providing data
about consumers and their consumption habits. 15
+ Referral/click-through - an information aggregator receives fee from merchants if it
generates sale for them by bringing in customers.
14 Business models on the web, Michael Rappa,
http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html#Subcription
15 Business models on the web, Michael Rappa, http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html#Subcription.
o Customized/personalized service - an information aggregator provides users tailored
services by monitoring their actions and requesting their preferences. This approach is
usually combined with advertising and subscription.
o Professional service/consulting - owning customer relationship and part of customer
data gives information aggregators advantage to provide professional
service/consulting. It is related to infomediary, but more complicated. Informediary
only involves data, while professional service/consulting involves data and consulting
projects.
. Application service provider - an information aggregator hosts the application and
data center and provides on-demand service to their clients via network.
In order to be profitable and sustainable, information aggregators should employ one or
more abovementioned business models.
2.2 Information Aggregation Industry Analysis
Information aggregators emerge in almost every industry. Although the dynamics of
different industries and the competition horizon are quite different, information
aggregators share several attributes in terms of business environment. In the rest of this
chapter, an industry analysis is done using Five Forces' framework (Figure 2-1).
of
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Figure 2-1: Five Forces
DEGREE OF RIVALRY
- Number of firms: not really a large number. If business model is brokerage, however,
information aggregators have to compete with existing traditional firms. On the other
hand, information aggregators usually complement current industry players, and integrate
information from different industries, so their relationship is not pure competition.
- Market growth: usually fast market growth. Information aggregators usually create a
new market. For example, Zillow's annual growth from 2005 to 2006 is 132.1%.
- Fixed costs: almost no fixed cost. Information aggregators have sunk cost, though,
including the cost to develop technology such as Zillow's Zestimate (see chapter 5) and
iShips' Price it, Track it, and Sell it (see chapter 3). Sometimes aggregators have to invest
in data center and computer servers.
- Storage cost and perishable products: N/A
- Switching cost: usually low in the beginning. Depending on the product/service itself
and user experience, switching cost could become higher or stay low.
- Levels of product differentiation: low in the beginning. An information aggregator has
to differentiate itself as fast as possible either through partnership or by becoming at least
one source of information.
- Strategic stakes: low. Usually an information aggregator starts as an independent entity.
If an aggregator is bought by another company later, the stakes will become higher, such
as shopping.com to CNET.
- Identity: low in the beginning. In general, an information aggregator is a newly started
independent company, so it doesn't have brand name. Later it might be bought by large,
established company, but usually that company keeps the aggregator's original name
because of organizational issue or because the aggregator has set up reputation to some
degree.
- Exit barriers: low. Generally it's easy for information aggregators to exit because their
main assets are technology, information, and talent skills. All these are easily
transferable. Their major sunk cost is technology they developed (see analysis in fixed
costs). For example, the management team of Zillow was a group of former executives of
Expedia, an earlier aggregator.
- Diversity of rivalry: yes. Since an information aggregator retrieves information from
various sources, aggregatees are potential rivals. Also, established internet companies
may also penetrate into this market. Section the competitive horizon in chapter 3, 4, 5
talks more about the diversity of rivalry in real world in different industries.
- Industry shakeout: N/A
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES
-Switching costs: low. Many information aggregators provide free services. The user
interface is normally simple, which implies smooth learning curve. However, the network
effect is huge and install base is important.
-Buyer inclination to substitute: no. Usually information aggregators are lead users and
technology savvy, who have advanced needs than general users.
-Price-performance trade-off of substitutes: poor. Compared with traditional players,
information aggregators have a better price-performance trade-off.
SUPPLIER POWER
- Supplier concentration: low. An information aggregator can retrieve from many
resources. But if the aggregator is in a closed and concentrated industry, things might be
different (see chapter 3).
- Importance of volume to supplier: N/A
- Differentiation of inputs: high. An information aggregator can decide to retrieve from
different resources.
- Impact of inputs on cost or differentiation: N/A on cost; big on differentiation.
Information source is essential.
- Switching costs of firms in the industry: low. Usually aggregatees are not aware of the
aggregation at all.
- Presence of substitute inputs: plenty.
- Threat of forward integration: generally high. An information aggregator can easily be
aggregated. Layered information would be harder to be aggregated. Also, it's easier to
integrate text information, but more difficult to integrate pictures and the back-end
databases.
- Cost relative to total purchases in industry: N/A. An information aggregator retrieves
publicly available information, so it's always free.
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
- Absolute cost advantages: low.
- Proprietary learning curve: low. Information aggregators usually use standard
information technology such as web wrapper, database, and semantic web; it's easy to
transfer the knowledge.
- Access to inputs: easy. The Internet is open standard. Also, there is no law to protect
data reuse in U.S." , so there is no need to establish partnerships with providers of
various data sources.
- Government policy: There is no law to prohibit data reuse in U.S.
- Economies of scale: tremendous. Once technology problems are solved, information
aggregators can pick almost every similar data sources and websites, so they can expand
at marginal cost.
- Capital requirements: median.
- Brand identity: no established brand, at least in the beginning.
- Switching costs: low. For consumers and information suppliers, both are low.
Information aggregation is web based (hosted), usually consumers don't need to install
software.
- Access to distribution: ubiquitous. The Internet is almost everywhere.
- Expected retaliation: high. An information aggregator has to prevent being aggregated.
- Proprietary products: no, at least in the initial phase.
BUYER POWER
- Bargaining leverage: weak. Most aggregators provide service to consumers for free.
-Buyer volume: N/A. For fee service, volume might be reflected by membership type,
though.
- Buyer information:
- Brand identity: not so important.
- Price sensitivity: high.
- Threat of backward integration: unlikely. For aggregators serve businesses, there
is possibility, but for aggregators serve consumers, it is unlikely to happen.
-Product differentiation: high.
- Buyer concentration vs. industry:
- Substitutes available: yes. Smart users can find info by themselves, but it's more
time consuming
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- Buyers' incentives: high. Information aggregators deliver attractive values to
customers (see previous part of this chapter).
Table 2-2 summarizes the analysis.
Table 2-2: Five Forces' Analysis
DEGREE OF
RIVALRY
THREAT OF
SUBSTITUTES
SUPPLIER
POWER
BARRIERS
TO ENTRY
+ in the
beginning, - as
more
competitors
enter
+
* number of firms: not many since information
aggregators usually enter as a lead user
* market growth: usually fast
* fixed costs: almost no fixed cost
* storage cost and perishable products: N/A
* levels of product differentiation: low in the first
place
* strategic stakes: usually information aggregators
start as an independent entity
* exit barriers: low, information and skills are
transferable
* diversity of rivalry: yes
* switching cost: low
* buyer inclination to substitute: no, lead users and
technology savvy have advanced needs than
normal users
* price-performance trade-off of substitutes: poor,
generally no charge to consumers
* supplier concentration: depends on the industry
where the information source locates
* importance of volume to supplier: N/A
* differentiation of inputs: high
* impact of inputs on cost or differentiation: N/A on
cost; big on differentiation
* switching costs of firms in the industry: low
* presence of substitute inputs: plenty
* threat of forward integration: high, can easily be
aggregated
* cost relative to total purchases in industry: N/A
* absolute cost advantages: low
* proprietary learning curve: low, standard web
technologies and transferable
BUYER
POWER
Above analysis shows that basically information aggregation is an attractive market with
minimal competition in the beginning, however, because of the low entry barrier,
competition will become fierce in a very short period. For companies to make sustainable
profit, they not only need to choose the initial business models, but also need to find out
optimal evolvement of their business models.
Figure 2-2 depicts entry and exit scenarios of information aggregation. According to
empirical observations, there are mainly three entry scenarios. Some information
aggregations are initiated by lead users, such as Zillow and RedRoller (see 1.1). Some are
started within an existing organization to fulfill the organization's own needs or to
capture new market trends, such as Intershipper and iShip (see chapter 3 for detail). Some
others are initiated to compare services and prices of online storefronts.
+
* access to inputs: easy
* government policy: no law to prohibit data reuse
in U.S.
* economies of scale: tremendous, traffic creates
opportunities, can expand at marginal cost
* capital requirements: median
* brand identity: no established brands
* switching costs: low, usually web-based
* access to distribution: ubiquitous, the Internet
* expected retaliation: high, can be aggregated
* proprietary products: no in the initial phase
* bargaining leverage: weak, most aggregators
provide service to consumer for free
* buyer volume: N/A
* buyer information:
o brand identity: no
o price sensitivity: high
o threat of backward integration: unlikely
* product differentiation: high
* buyer concentration vs. industry:
o substitutes available: yes
o buyers' incentives: high.
ENTRY
EXIT
Figure 2-2: Entry/Exit Scenarios of Information Aggregation
Similarly, information aggregators can develop several exit scenarios. Some information
aggregators are bought by other companies and become an integrated unit within the
organization, such as iShip (see chapter 3 for details). Some optimize their business
models according to their own competences and the industry dynamics and become
profitable independent aggregators, such as Yodlee (see chapter 4 for details). Still others
totally change their business models, enter traditional businesses by utilizing information
aggregation as an enabler, and continue to use information aggregation as a tool for their
traditional operation (see CTrip case in chapter 6 for details).
Information aggregators have to differentiate themselves as they evolve their business
models. In the following chapters, several case studies in various industries will be
analyzed. The business models of each aggregator are analyzed. Supplementary business
models will be suggested whenever appropriate. Also, we might see that some
information aggregators become no longer a pure information aggregator by choosing
other internet business models or penetrate into traditional businesses.
3 Aggregatee Industry: Shipping Industry
3.1 Industry Overview
According to a research done by Forrester, online retail sales will grow from $172 billion
in 2005 to $329 billion in 2010. Online sales will enjoy a solid 14% compound annual
growth rate (CAGR) over the next five years. 17 And, of course, as online sales increase,
package shipments also increase. E-commerce companies and consumers demand
shipping convenience and choices. Many shipping carriers have e-commerce shipping
solutions, to name some, UPS, FedEx, DHL, and Airborne. Usually these solutions can
be categorized into two types - for individuals and for e-commerce companies.
Individuals are concerned about shipping price and service convenience, while e-
commerce companies are concerned about not only abovementioned two, but also ease of
integration into their entire solutions. Most carriers provide online shipping solutions for
free, but within own shipping system. If users want to compare offerings of different
carriers, they need to find multi-carrier shipping solutions. This is where shipping
information aggregators come to play.
Shipping industry has following characteristics.
: A few and powerful players have significant market share. For example, USPS and
UPS account for more than 85% of the entire E-Commerce shipping market 18. These
few aggregatees are very powerful.
* Aggregatees in the industry hold close and strong about their profit position. They
refuse to give up control of any of three customer assets: relationship, data, and
transaction. This way, they prevent products and services they provided from
becoming commodity. In contrast, passenger airlines industry is pushed by Internet-
inspired wars and becomes open.
In the following part of this chapter two case studies of information aggregators in
shipping industry will be presented to illustrate how business models of information
aggregators in a closed and concentrated industry evolve in order to make profit.
3.2 Intershipper and iShip
3.2.1 Intershipper
Intershipper was founded in 1992 as a spin-off of BITS Inc., which sells network
equipment online and hosting online storefronts for various merchants. It's a publicly
listed company on Canada TSX stock exchange market 19. Intershipper provides web-
based shipping management services to small Internet storefronts. In fact, the company
17 Carrie A. Johnson, http://www.forrester.com/Research/Document/Excerpt/0,7211,37626,00.html
18 Stamps.com Scoops Up iShip.com To Comer Online Shipping Mkt, Newsbytes News Network, October
25, 1999
19www.tsx.com
provides API (application programming interface) to more than ten different shopping
cart software products, such as Click Cart Pro, CoolerBiz, and X-Cart (a full list of
supported shopping cart software programs can be found in appendix 1). These shopping
cart solutions, in turn, are used by various online merchants. The shipping module
supports major carriers like FedEx, USPS, and DHL, and provides multi-carrier shipping
choices, with package pricing, shipping and tracking functionalities.
The public/manual shipping inquiry is free. That is, by inputting package information
such as weights, source zip code, destination zip code and desired shipping services, one
can find prices and service details of multi-carriers. For example, if a user wants to ship a
10-lbs package from Cambridge, MA (02139) to Urbana, IL (61801). The website will
display available shipping methods from various carriers with their prices. In this case,
the price ranges from less than $10 to more than $100 (see Table 3-1).
Table 3-1: Intershipper Shipping Comparison Information
Quick Quote
Summary
From Zip: 01239
Delivery- Business
To Zip: 61801
Weight: 10 lbs
Results
carrier
* Federal Express
" Federal Express
* Federal Express
" Federal Express
* Federal Express
* Federal Express
* United Parcel Service
* United Parcel Service
* United Parcel Service
* United Parcel Sarvice
" United Parcel Service
* United Parcel Service
" United Parcel Service
" U.S. Postal Service
* U.S. Postal Service
* U.S. Postal Service
* U.S. Postal Service
Service
FDX 2nd Da
FDX Express Saver
FDX First Overnight
FDX Priority Overnight
FDX Standard Overnight
FDX Ground
UPS 3 Day Select
UPS 2nd Day Air
UPS 2nd Day Air AM
UPS Next Day Air Saver
UPS Next Day Air
UPS Next Day Air Early AM
UPS Ground
USP Express Mail
USP Parcel Post Machine
USP Parcel Post Non-Machine
USP Priority Mail
m DHL Wodd Wide Express Next Day Air 10:30 AM
Rate
$32.69
$22.31
$100.11
$71.74
$66.29
$8.04
$21.57
$32.69
$38.37
$66.29
$71.74
$104.08
$10.05
$45.25
$16.01
$16.01
$16.95
$66.53
However, if customers want to use Intershipper's shipping module in their E-Commerce
solution, they have to pay Intershhipper a monthly fee, which covers a certain amount of
transaction, depending on the type of their memberships. If they exceed the transaction
amounts, they need to pay overage charge for each package. The members are usually
shopping cart software developers, who sell their products to E-commerce companies and
auction sites. The cheap entry-level membership allows these small companies, especially
start-ups to spend a modest investment before they can test their entire solution. The
company charges membership fee from $9.99 to $144.99 per month. Available plans are
shown in Table 3-2.20
Table 3-2: Intershipper Membership Fee
Bronze 100 $0.1 $9.99
Note: monthly fees billed by Intershipper are based on the number of shipping rate
lookups performed (lookup, instead of actual sales, will incur fee).
One user here means one account. If many users in a business want to use the service
simultaneously, the business has to register many user accounts. It's hard to share
resource, which is inconvenient for a business unit. While at the same time, enterprise
shipping accounts for the largest portion of the entire online shipping industry. The
reason why Intershipper didn't develop enterprise solution is not clear. It might be related
to the company's origination, which was to support small online storefronts; it might also
be because of lacking of key competitive advantages such as marketing and product
development, as we can see Intershipper has always been struggled financially (see
Figure 3-2).
It is usually anticipated that early movers will get higher market share and have a bigger
influence. However, many players compete in this field. Figure 3-1 shows how the entire
online shipping market is divided by different channels. Some big E-Commerce
companies have their in-house shopping cart solutions, and others use commercial
shopping cart software. Some shopping cart software companies develop shipping
module by themselves, and yet others integrate publicly available shipping modules,
provided by companies like Intershipper. So basically, Intershipper is on the bottom of
the chain, competing in a rather small market, and at the same time facing strong
competitions from many other companies who provide similar services. Along the chain,
20 www.intershipper.com
$0.09
$0.08
$0.07
$0.06
Silver
Gold
Platinum
Diamond
1
1
1
1
300
600
1200
2400
$24.99
$44.99
$84.99
$144.99
every decision is based on the benefit-price trade-offs, which imposes big pressure on
Intershipper's revenue module. 3.3 The competitive horizon will talk more about
competitions Intershipper faces.
Even in the small market, Intershipper is in a disadvantageous position because it can not
provide information of some major carriers like UPS. UPS strongly objects any attempt
to compare shipping prices, especially when it's done by an outsider. On the other hand,
as we can see in 3.2.2, iShip, a whole subsidiary of UPS, also compares shipping prices.
In any case, UPS is strong and stubborn enough to inhibit independent aggregators from
listing UPS's service into their aggregated offerings. This is also the case of RedRoller
(see 3.3.1).
Figure 3-1: Positioning of Intershipper in Online Shipping Service
Since Intershipper actually provides technology solutions to commercial software,
following issues are critical to Intershipper's success.
* Whether the interface is open and standardized; if it's standardized, Intershipper can
develop one universal module for each shopping cart software product on the market.
In reality, the interface is not standardized.
+ Whether major shopping cart software use Intershipper's module or not, which in turn
depends on following criteria:
* How many carriers does Intershipper support?
E-Comnmerce
Shipping Service
In-house Shopping Shopping Cart Shipping ModuleCart Solution Software Products Included I
Shipping APIs
Intershipper Other API Providers
(iShip, Digitalshipper, etc)
Notes: the weight of arrows illustrate the portions of market share.
* The software's quality, such as stability, ease-to-integrate, support service, and
upgradeability.
A very active shopping cart community: VirtueMart gives us some insight regarding
Inthershipper's product and service 21. Following are some comments copied from the
Shipping, shipping modules & related sub-forum.
* I have directly contacted Intershipperfor help, but they do not offer any support for
either the original version ofphpShop or Soeren's Mambo port ofphpShop.
+ Intershipper is a special module, which I never used and which never really worked
for me. Ijust ported it to Mambo.
. Original phpShop now threw the Intershipper module out of their distribution v.
0.8.0. I think mambo-phpShop will too don't support Intershipper in the future...
*. There's a UPS webservice available... I think this will be a great alternative to
Intershipper for mambo-phpShop... ?!!
*. As for Intershipper... You can signupfor afree 30 day account with them. This will
get you the username and password you need to test your current Intershipper
module. Granted, after 30 days ifyou want to keep the account you would have to pay
around $10 USD per month to continue to use their service. A small price to pay to
actually get a usable shipping system for your port ofphpShop.
Although it's not a full coverage of the usage of Intershipper shipping module, it is clear
that Intershipping solution is mainly used by small businesses because it provides free
test account and charge a modest fee for them to deploy the entire shipping solution. On
the other hand, the company doesn't provide good services and fast upgrade. The reason
might be that the company is short of resources because of ever accumulated operation
loss (see Figure 3-2, detailed data can be found in appendix 2) 23. Actually, in 2003 the
company outsourced its software development to iMSR 24
21 http://www.virtuemart.com/
22 Mambo is a Content Management System (CMS). It is the engine behind websites that simplifies the
creation, management, and sharing of content. In the hands of a custom developer, Mambo is a powerful
platform for a wide variety of Internet applications that go far above and beyond the simple creation of
content. http://www.mamboserver.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=-view&id=81 &Itemid=86
23 http://www.tsx.com/
24 Intershipper Quarterly Report, 5/31/2003
Figure 3-2: Intershipper Revenue vs. Expense 1997-2006
In 2006, Intershipper's annual revenue is $56,553. 25 Its major customers are small
website storefront. Suppose that all of their customers are bronze registered users, so each
package sent using Intershipper's service contributes $0.1 to the annual revenue. Annual
revenue of $56,553 means altogether there are 565,530 packages sent using
Intershipper's service. Assume each package costs $16 on average, so the actual market
size of the shipping using Intershipper's service would be $9,048,480 (= 565,530 * $16).
If the entire online shipping market is 1 billion dollars 26, the market share of Intershipper
would be 0.9% (=$9,048,480/1,000,000,000) (see Table 3-3).
Table 3-3: Intershipper Market Share in Online Shipping
Annual Revenue ($)
Fees Intershipper Charge Per Package ($)
Average Cost Per Package ($)
E-Commerce Shipping Service Market Size ($)
Packages Sent Using Intershipper's Service
Market Size of Shipping Service
Using Intershipper's Service ($)
Market Share of Intershipper
in E-Commerce Shipping Service
$ 56,553
$ 0.1
$ 16
$1,000,000,000
565,530
$ 9,048,480
0.90%
DC t
Comments
year 2006
assume all users are
Bronze users (note 1 )
I I(C
I-C6.c41
10 note 1 : if not all users are Bronze users, the calculated market share wil be even lower.
25 http://www.tsx.com/
26 Services Compare Shipping Costs Instantly, InternetWeek: 9, June 12, 2000
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3.2.2 iShip
iShip, Inc.'s founders got their start in the shipping business in 1993, when UPS (United
Parcel Service) contracted with them to develop UPS OnLine Professional. 27 In 1997,
iShip.com was founded to provide Internet shipping service, and signed MBE (Mail
Boxes Etc.) as the first customer.
In October 1999, Stamps.com purchased iShip.com in the hope to provide Internet-based
end-to-end shipping services. Stamps.com introduced the iShip Enterprise Service for
corporate customers in May 2000. Also, Stamps.com deployed iShip's services at MBE
stores. However, the business with MBE was severely impaired when UPS bought MBE
in March, 2001 and announced not to continue using iShip's services. Eventually, in May
2001, UPS acquired iShip.com to enhance its Internet shipping capacity.
Today, iShip is an independent, wholly-owned subsidiary of UPS. Its mission is to gve
customers shipping insight through Internet-based, multi-carrier shipping services.
iShip provides free online services like Price It, Track It, and Sell It. When users input
package weight, source zip code, destination zip code, they can get a list of services from
various carriers with their list price (see Table 3-4). The functionality is similar to that of
Intershipper, but with a more intuitive interface. Users can also track multi-carrier
packages online. In 1999, eBay entered a 5-year deal with iShip. At that time, eBay users
send 150,000-200,000 items daily, responsible for almost 5% of all packages shipped
between people in the US 29.
Table 3-4: iShip Pricelt
10-lbs package, source zip code - 02139, destination zip code - 61801 30
iShip also provides UPS and MBE stores with similar services, helping these retail stores
to price, ship and track packages with multi-carriers. In 2000, when Stamps.com owned
the company, it charged customers 75 cents for each package shipped.31 At that time
27 http://www.iship.com/about_history.htm
28 http://www.iship.com/about_history.htm
29 EBay Plans To Provide Integrated Shipping, Newsbytes News Network, April 12, 1999
30 www.iship.com
31 Stamps.com To Unveil Web Services To Ship Packages, Information Week: 140, June 05, 2000.
Stamps.com was deploying iShip's services at 1,400 Mail Boxes Etc locations. However,
when UPS bought MBE in March, 2001, UPS announced that it would stop deploying
iShip's service in MBE stores32. According to 2000 annual report of Stamps.com, United
Parcel Service has informed us that it is unlikely to have Mail Boxes Etc. USA, Inc.
continue to use our online shipping services in the future. These events bring into doubt
the realization of revenue from our investment in iShip.com, Inc. Stamps.com eventually
reduced their valuation of iShip and sold the company to UPS in May, 2001. Now, the
product is deployed in over 4,200 UPS Store franchises, Mail Boxes Etc. franchises and
over 1,000 UPS Customer Centers nationwide to ship tens of millions of packages
annually 33. The fee is now unclear. UPS might provide this service for free to these stores.
By doing so UPS actually adds the switching cost of these stores, and eventually binds
them closer to it.
For enterprise customers, iShip provides a Web-based shipping solution that allows users
to centrally manage shipping activities across multiple carriers and corporate locations.
iShip doesn't disclose carriers included in enterprise solution. The overall number of
supported carriers might be large. On the other hand, carriers for each client might be
highly customized, which means, iShip may add or remove carriers based on enterprise
customers' real business needs, depending on their own relationship and contracts with
various carriers. Because iShip's service is tailored and complement the real-world
business relationships between enterprises and their shipping service providers, shipping
service providers should be willing to cooperate with iShip. In the end of 2000, while
iShip was owned by Stamps.com, it had 17 committed enterprise customers, with
estimated annual shipping transaction volume of four million packages 34. Current number
of customers is unclear, but it's unlikely that iShip provides it for free since this product
provides aggregated information of multi-carrier.
Based on above analysis, it is estimated that in 2000, annual revenue of iShip was near
$20 million, divided by following categories.
o E-Commerce: $5.5 million
Table 3-5: iShip E-Commerce Revenue
2
3
4
A B C D
Comments
Number of Items eBay Users Send Daily 150,000 year 1999Input SFees iShip Charge Per Package ($) 0.1 same as Intershipper
Output E-Commerce Revenue ($) 5,475,000 =12*3*365
o* Enterprise Service: Product, the basic revenue $3 million
32Stamps.com, Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2000
33 iShip shipping solutions - Retail, http://www.iship.com/solutions_retail.htm
34 Stamps.com Sees Losses Mount... Online Reporter, November 06, 2000
Table 3-6: iShip Enterprise Service Revenue
A B C D
7 Comnuents
8 Annual Number of Shipping Transactions 4,000,000
Input9 Charges Per Transaction 0.75 year 2000
10 Output Enterprise Service Revenue ($) 3,000,000 I=c8*c
* Retail Service: $11.5 million
Table 3-7: iShip Retail Service Revenue
A B C D
Conmuents
Number of Franchise Stores 1,400 year 2000
Input Packages Send Per Store Per Day 30 assumption
Charges Per Package Shipped ($) 0.75 price starts at $0.3
Output Retail Service Revenue ($) 1 1 ,4 9 7 , 50 0P = EI4*I5S*CI6*365
Figure 3-3 depicts the revenue distribution of e-commerce, enterprise service, and retail
service.
iShip 2000 Revenue Distribution
o
I E-Commerce
m Enterprise Service
o Retail Service
%/I
I '.J
Figure 3-3: iShip Revenue Distribution
Based on above data, it is clear that potentially iShip can make good profit, especially
from retail service. However, as mentioned above, when UPS acquired MBE and
announced discontinuing of iShip's service, the revenue of this part was severely
impaired. On the other hand, after UPS bought iShip, it actually expanded iShip's service
to all MBE stores and its own stores. It is not clear how UPS charges for this. UPS might
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just see iShip as a strategic existence, which gives UPS the leverage to own the three
customer assets: relationship, data, and transaction. Only data itself would be very
valuable to UPS because that data has shipping information of multi carriers. UPS can
mine the data to find out customer shipping patterns. Also, it can find out potential
market growth and adjust its strategy to capture it. It can even monitor performance of its
competitors and carry out more guided competition.
Table 3-8 listed major events happened on iShip's history. It's interesting to notice that
UPS actually gave birth to iShip. iShip then grew on its own in the Internet boom and
provided powerful tools in online shipping. Companies tried to integrate iShip's service
into their end-to-end solutions. During this course, iShip's worth fluctuated along with its
relationships with major players in this industry. In the end, it was purchased by the most
powerful player in shipping industry - UPS, and became part of UPS's total solution to
its all types of customers.
Table 3-8: iShip Business Development
1997
April, 1999
October,
1999
March,
2001
May, 2001
Founded as Internet
Shipping Service Center
eBay Inc, talk with iship to
offer its customers online
shipping service through a
5-year deal
Stamps.com purchased
iShip.com for $305
million35
MBE was bought by UPS
UPS bought iShip for $2.8
million36
iShip, Inc.'s founders got their start in
the shipping business in 1993, when
UPS contracted with them to develop
UPS OnLine Professional.
eBay users send 150,000-200,000 items
daily responsible for almost 5% of all
packages shipped between people in the
US.
Planned to deploy iShips Internet
shipping service to 3,500 MBE
franchises. Stamps.com charges 75 cents
per transaction.
Finished deploying iShip multi-carrier
shipping services in 1,400 MBE
franchises
UPS said it was unlikely that MBE
continued to use iShip's multi-carrier
shipping service
After acquisition, UPS deployed iShip's
multi-carrier shipping services in its
35 Stamps.com agrees to acquire Iship.com, New York Times (National Edition), CXLIX (51,687): C4,
October 26, 1999
4,200 MBE franchises and UPS
franchises and more than 1,000
customer centers.
In 2005, iShip achieved revenue of $5 million37 . It is safe to assume that UPS is not very
eager to advertise or deploy multi-carrier services because it might cannibalize its own
business. On the other hand, online shopping is increasing dramatically in recent years,
and so does online shipping. In 2005, for example, online shopping increased 22 percent,
extending a seven-year trend of double-digit growth. 38 UPS can definitely just leverage
iShip to acquire this market share without requiring iShip itself to be profitable. For
example, with the data from multiple carriers, UPS can get a better understanding of the
market trend and its own advantages and disadvantages, and therefore adjust accordingly.
Also, knowing information of other carriers gives UPS more insight and bargain power
when negotiating with E-commerce companies.
3.2.3 Comparison between iShip and Intershipper
It is clear that iShip has a better performance than Intershipper. The reasons are as
following.
*:o iShip is the subsidiary of major E-commerce shipping players, first Stamps.com, and
then UPS, which gives it bigger leverage to negotiate with E-Commerce companies.
For example, UPS can give shipping discount to those companies if they choose to
work with iShip. It's a win-win situation.
*o iShip can integrate almost all the major carrier information, while Intershipper can't
provide shipping information of UPS, possibly due to UPS's objection (see 3.3.1 for
UPS' comments on RedRoller. UPS might have similar attitude towards
Intershipper).
o Technology didn't play an important role here, at least in the beginning. As time goes
by, iShip may get its product better because it has more budget, resources and
leverages.
*o The only chance for independent information aggregator Intershipper to win is to be
technically strong enough to acquire significant market share of online small
storefronts shipping service. When it achieves this, it has power to negotiate with
shipping carriers such as UPS, or UPS will ask to be added into Intershipper's list. If
Intershipper can't achieve this, it will go through a deteriorating cycle.
36 Stamps.com Form 10-K, year ended at December 31,2001
37 Hoovers Online
38 UPS Annual Report 2005
3.3 The Competitive Horizon
3.3.1 Other Aggregators
There were many other information aggregators, especially in late 1990s, when Internet
boomed. However, most of them didn't make good profit, and later either changed their
courses or were bought by other companies (see Table 3-9).
RedRoller, a newly established company, boasts software by eBayer and for eBayer.
Established in 2006, the company plans to make profit from advertising and click-
through to major carriers. RedRoller doesn't aggregate information from UPS. Actually,
UPS made following comments on RedRoller, "We don't have any issues with companies
that want to compare shipping prices. We feel like we offer a great value, and we offer
the best technology to support it.... We resist companies that attempt to insert themselves
between us and our customers."39 UPS is a behemoth in shipping industry and as it stated,
it offers a complete portfolio of products and services to its customers, and it is very alert
to any attempt to take from them the three customer assets: relationship, data, and
transaction. RedRoller has to face the animosity between UPS and itself.
Table 3-9 shows a list of shipping information aggregators 40. It in the other perspective
indicates the fierce competition in this area. Some of them did very good job in collecting
source information, for example, TanData can provide the price of shipping for more than
700 major carriers. Some promoted standard in this industry, such as GoShip.
Table 3-9: Other Shipping Information Aggregators
TanData
GoShip.com
1980
1999
Its software can provide the price
of shipping for more than 700
major carriers, from FedEx to
Yellow Freight.
The company tried to boast the
standard in this industry.
The company made money by
In 1995, entered
internet shipping
market.
Bought by
ConnectShip, Inc., a
wholly-owned
subsidiary of UPS on
August 15, 2001.
Not a shipping
information
aggregator anymore.
39 www.redroller.com
40 UPS Acquires iShip.com Assets, Online Reporter, May 28, 2001
OKLAHOMA'S TANDATA SOFTWARE A HIT WITH MICROSOFT, Tulsa World (OK), December 21,
1996
charging online merchants a Not in shipping
transaction fee that range from 50 industry.
cents to a dollar per order
depending on volumes.
RedRoller 2006 The company plans to make Carriers include U.S.
money selling ads and shipping Postal Service, DHL,
supplies and by charging "click- FedEx, Eastern
through" fees to some shipping Connection and
firms. Consumers who compare Ovemite Express.
shipping prices aren't charged.
The service is free to the more
than 7.9 million small businesses
in the US and can save them as
much as 25%-50% on annual
shipping costs.
It is interesting to notice that RedRoller employs different business models.
* Selling ads. When navigating through RedRoller's website at
http://www.redroller.com (see Figure 3-4), I found that there are no clear
advertisements. Since RedRoller just started in June 2005, it might have not recruited
many advertisers.
* Selling shipping supplies. Figure 3-5 shows RedRoller's shipping supplies webpage.
RedRoller's homepage (Figure 3-4) shows that the major functionality/value
presented to customers is shipping service comparison. Although it's a good idea to
present shipping supplies together with shipping comparison services, selling
shipping supplies is a totally different business, requiring different competitive
advantages in areas such as marketing and operation. Even if RedRoller only intends
to aggregate online shipping supplies information, it requires an entire set of different
assets and competencies. For example, in comparison services, aggregatees are
shipping firms; while in shipping supplies, aggregatees are shipping supply online
stores. In any case, shipping supplies is a serious business in its own right. My own
experience suggests that RedRoller hasn't put much effort in this aspect. As an
example, I selected three items on the website - 2 Boxes and 1 Binder Clips; for all
three products I was re-directed to the same website:
http://www.discountofficesupplies.com/. If RedRoller doesn't provide value-added
services, it's hard to convince customers to use its services instead of going directly
to shipping supply online stores.
* "Click-through" fees to some shipping firms. Because RedRoller didn't disclose this
information, it's hard to estimate whether it's successful or not. On the other hand,
due to power balance between RedRoller and shipping firms such as USPS, DHL,
and FedEx, it's safe to assume that RedRoller has very little bargain power to
negotiate a lucrative contract.
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Nevertheless, if RedRoller can accumulate a large customer base, it can definitely thrive
from these three business models. In fact, accumulating customer base is exactly
RedRoller's strategy. RedRoller's homepage (see Figure 3-4) clearly conveys the signal
that it's on customers' side - to serve end customers, saving their money and time, and
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for free. RedRoller's strategy and objective are similar to Zillow's; see Zillow case study
in chapter 5 for what techniques it employs to accumulate customer base.
3.3.2 Competitors Who Are Not Information Aggregators
As mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, all major carriers provide free service
package to their customers. Usually, these services are less attractive than those of
aggregators because carriers usually only provide information of their own services. On
the other hand, carriers can provide more sophisticated functionalities because they have
more resources and own the entire three customer assets: relationship, data, and
transaction. In order to compete with carriers, information aggregators have to present a
good ROI (return on investment). Besides shipping carriers, ERP software vendors are
another kind of competitors because some of them integrate shipping and logistics
management functionality into their products. In addition, some companies provides
stand-alone off-line software products to small businesses, for example, UPSS (Universal
Parcel Shipping Software), a multi-carrier packaging and shipping software company,
supports UPS, FedEx, USPS, and DHL41. It can also integrate those carriers free online
service interface. The company charges $499 for the software product.
In summary, shipping information aggregators face competition from following parties:
* Free service package provided by major carriers
o ERP software vendor's shipping and logistics module
o Stand-alone off-line software programs
3.4 Conclusion
Shipping information aggregators, by providing comparison aggregation, mainly focus on
acquiring customer relationship. Depending on what carriers aggregators include in their
comparison and what criteria they compare, aggregators actually influence customers'
shipping choices. Some information aggregators also own customer data. For example,
UPS can get customer shipping data via iShip's multi-carrier enterprise solution. In
Interhshipper's case, shopping cart solution providers, instead of Intershipper, own the
data. As to transaction, because actual shipping services require substantial infrastructure,
shipping carriers, not aggregators, own transaction. On the top, no matter who owns what
customer assets, in shipping industry, a few powerful aggregatees resist losing the control
of any customer asset.
In a closed and concentrated industry like shipping industry, information aggregators can
build their business models by integrating into carriers' vertical solution, like iShip has
done. In order to achieve that, the information aggregator has to partner with traditional
players to get company specific information. Aggregator also needs to acquire and
integrate customized information such as negotiated shipping rate and company shipping
41 www.upss.com
policies. Compared with independent aggregators, partnership aggregator has following
advantages:
+ Richer information source - not only publicly available information, but also
proprietary information, such as information of specific discount rate.
+ Can be easily integrated into the end-to-end solution.
*. Can easily provide tailored service to its customers - for example, can tailor the
shipping service based on the company's shipping policies.
The relationship with a few powerful aggregatees is critical to the success of information
aggregators. Without powerful aggregatees' backup or at least consent, it's very hard for
information aggregators to provide a complete solution, to acquire market share, and
ultimately to make profit.
Business models analysis in this industry is as follow:
. Advertising - RedRoller plans to use it. Right now, RedRoller's website doesn't
clearly show any advertisements, so whether it's effective is still a question. Most
aggregators didn't adopt this revenue model. Shipping information is dynamic, based
on many parameters such as package weight, delivery date, and distance. It's hard for
carriers to advertise. Also, there is little value for them to advertise because many
service charges are actually customized.
*o Brokerage - it's not used by any aggregator. Shipping service providers and service
recipients directly connect with each other.
• Subscription - Intershipper charges its users monthly subscription fee.
o Licensing - it's used by TanData. UPS marketed software built around TanData's
Transportation API, and license the API to other software developers.
*• Infomediary - not used.
• Referral/click-through. GoShip.com made money by charging online merchants a
transaction fee. RedRoller also plans to use it.
o Customized/personalized service - iShip provides this service in their enterprise
software products.
* Professional service/consulting - iShip provides this service to enterprise users.
* Application service provider - not used.
4 Aggregatee Industry: Financial Service Industry
4.1 Industry Overview
As of mid-2002, there were 7,966 commercial banks, 1,500 savings institutions in U.S.,
accounting for over 90% of the assets of the banking system42. Many of the financial
institutions offer online banking service. Online banking usually offers such features as43:
*:* Bank statements
* Electronic billpayment
. Funds transfer between a customer's own checking and savings accounts, or to
another customer's account
. Investment purchase or sale
4: Loan applications and transactions, such as repayments
*. Account aggregation to allow the customers to monitor all of their accounts in one
place whether they are with their main bank or with other institutions.
There are at least five benefits of online banking:
: Convenience
* Ubiquity
o* Transaction Speed
o* Efficiency and Effectiveness
o Cost Reduction. On average, an in-branch transaction costs $1.50, an ATM
transaction costs 55 cents, and an Internet transaction costs just 1 cent44.
The flourish of online banking formed base for account aggregation development. As
number of accounts and types of accounts one user owns increase, the need for an
integrated account management system increases. More and more complicated online
transactions like bill payment, investment purchase or sale, and loan management also
require such a system. On the other hand, account aggregation improves capacity of
complex online transaction by pulling all relevant information to the same place at the
same time.
Account aggregation solution providers emerged in late 1990's. They initially provided
account aggregation, which integrates user's email accounts, reward accounts, bank
accounts, and others into a single web-based interface. As this chapter will show, later
they penetrated into almost all aspects of online banking, such as electronic bill payment,
42 Commercial Banking Forecast Q2, 2004, BMI research
43 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online banking
44 The Internet and Beyond: Banking in the Next Millennium, Calvin D. Johnson
funds transfer, and investment management. User base, number of clients, and partners of
account aggregators have increased greatly since their inception.
Bank's attitude toward account aggregation is mixed. In the early phase, banks were
skeptical about the service, mainly out of privacy and security concern. The early
adopters are primarily web portals such as AOL, YAHOO, and MSN. Although later
many banks provide account aggregation services in its online banking solutions, banks
usually don't promote the service very much. One example magnifies the mixed feeling
of banks towards account aggregators. Citibank's My Accounts service was one of the
first major account aggregation services, though this service ended in late 2005 without
explanation from Citibank. 45 Citibank's customers strongly complained about the
inconvenience, 46 yet Citibank didn't resume the service. While banks hesitated to adopt
account aggregation service, aggregators realized in the very early phase that they have to
work together with banks because customers trust their relationships with their banks the
most. Currently, many big financial institutions provide account aggregation services
through their online banking offers, to name some, BankofAmerica MyPortfolio, HSBC
EasyView, Fidelity FullView, and Wachovia OneStop.
The following part of the chapter will study aggregators and explore answers for
following questions:
o Why do banks want to use aggregator's service; has the investment of banks paid off?
o! What's the relationship between aggregator and aggregatee?
o How do products and services provided by aggregators change along time?
4.2 VerticalOne and Yodlee
4.2.1 Yodlee
Yodlee is a leading account aggregator. It was founded in February, 1999. Since then,
Yodlee has greatly increased its user base and struck deals with various clients, including
30 of the top 50 global financial institutions. Yodlee partnered with security companies
such as Arcot Systems Inc. and PassMark Security Inc. in order to comply with higher
security standards and requirements. Also, Yodlee partnered with internet banking
software and services providers like S1 to utilize their distribution channels. In 2005,
Yodlee's achieved annual revenue of $16.5 million47
Yodlee experienced several stages during its development. The first phase is between its
inception and August, 2003. In this phase, Yodlee mainly developed and marketed its
account aggregation product. Web portals and financial service providers (FSP) paid
Yodlee licensing and per-user fees for the aggregation service, which can range from
45 Yodlee Gets Discover Pact, Loses a Citi One. American Banker, 170 (127): 11, July 05, 2005.
ISSN: 0002-7561
46 http://www.fatwallet.com/forums/arcmessageview.php?catid=52&threadid=
5 11100
47 Hoovers http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/basic/factsheet.xhtml?ID=hcchjyjx
$100,000 to $300,000.48 The growth of the company was indicated by the increasing
number of adopters, both end user wise and web portal/FSP wise. Yodlee did a good job
in this period. The initial adopters were web portals like AOL, MSN, and AltaVista.
Portals had been quicker to accept the account aggregation tools because their structures
and recent genesis enabled them to move faster. Later Yodlee signed up with some major
FSPs like Bank of America, CitiGroup, Chase Manhattan, and Wells Fargo. Yodlee
eventually became the market leader, and merged with the second runner VerticalOne in
January, 200149. The new merged company had 88 clients with altogether 425,000 end
users. After the merge, Yodlee continued to increase its customer base. Till November,
2002, the number of end users was 3,300,000 and the number of clients was 150. The
company managed to grab account information from more than 7,000 websites50 . Figure
4-1 depicts the growth of end users and company clients (detailed data can be found in
appendix 3).
Figure 4-1: Yodlee Account Aggregation Adoption Curves
In the first phase, although the number of users grew very fast, Yodlee actually didn't
bring direct revenue to FSPs. Generally FSPs provide the service for free. So what is the
motivation behind all these financial institutions? To answer this question, one thing
comes into the view. While Yodlee provides software to large web portals and banks, it
also provides free account aggregation services on its own website. Banks usually license
one version of the software and keep using it, while Yodlee always has the newest
version on the website. So what's the motivation of Yodlee doing this, in spite of possible
48 First Union to Offer Aggregate Service to Show All Accounts, Charlotte Observer (NC), November 07,
2000
49 Top 'screen-scrapers' agree merger, Retail Banker International: 1, December 12, 2000
50 Fidelity Taking Yodlee Aggregation In-House, American Banker, 167 (222): 19, November 19, 2002.
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cannibalization to its clients? To answer this question, we need to look deep into the
relationships between Yodlee, FSPs, and end customers. As mentioned above, FSPs
initially didn't like Yodlee's service. On the other hand, end customers like the services
and pushed their FSPs to provide this service. So basically the small ecosystem here is
customer driven. By providing free aggregation service on its own website, Yodlee can
achieve at least two benefits. First, it can set up brand name; second, it can educate
customer and accumulate customer base, which then gives Yodlee more leverage in its
market efforts. The essential base here is that customers actually like the product/service.
That's exactly the case. The solution Yodlee provides is very sticky. Once the consumers
use it, they tend to depend on it. Eventually, consumers will be the big promoter of
Yodlee products to their banks. Figure 4-2 shows how Yodlee's product might affect
51customer acquisition .
Q: If a financial institution--other than one you already
have a relationship with--offered Yodlee BillPay and
Yodlee PersonalFinance, how likely would you be to
establish an account at that bank to use the online
banking suite?
SWoudk
M ight or night not
Wouldk not
Total (n= 1,204) PFM users (n= Likely to use
303) PersonalFinance
and BillPay (n=
691)
Figure 4-2: Enhanced Functionalities as a Customer Acquisition Factor
Although end users and clients grew very rapidly, Yodlee's business model was weak
because of two reasons:
. The service is free for end constomers, so no direct revenue for FSPs, while
FSPs have to pay Yodlee license fee.
°* Except for higher customer retention rate, FSPs see no direct business
opportunities from this service. To benefit from aggregated data, FSPs have to
do data mining. However, in this phase, both customer base and customer
activity level are relatively low for any single FSP, so data mining is not very
meaningful. Also, data mining itself requires big investment, and doesn't
guarantee success.
51 Aite's white paper on Next-Generation Online Banking and BillPay, http://corporate.vodlee.com/,
November 2006
In this phase, Yodlee marketed the service as stand-alone. There are two characteristics
of this approach: the solution itself is stand-alone, and the distribution channel is
independent.
The second phase is between August, 2003 and April, 2006. In this phase, on top of its
account aggregation, Yodlee developed bill payment and presentment product BillPay
and fund transfer product FundsTransfer. Yodlee charges $2 per user per month for
BillPay52 . According to Yodlee53 , BillPay gives financial institutions the lowest total cost
of ownership by: 1) additional interchange revenue and interest on carried balances for
bills paid by credit or debit cards, 2) shared savings from least cost routing, and 3)
increased overall profitability per customer. Yodlee estimates that BillPay can bring over
$40 in revenue to FSP per user per year. 54 The average number of bills one user pays per
month is 3, and the average charge per bill is $62.5, so the total monthly amount one user
pays via BillPay is $187.5. If a user uses credit card to pay the bills, FSP gets an
interchange fee 55 of 1.8 percent of the entire transaction amount, that is, an interchange
fee of $3.375 per month, so the annual revenue is $40.5 (see detail in Table 4-1).
Meanwhile, BillPay brings annual revenue of $24 per user to Yodlee (see detail in Table
4-2).
Table 4-1: FSP's BillPay Annual Revenue Per User
1
2
3
4
6
6
7
8
9
A B C D
Comments
Bills Per User Per Month 3
Input Average Charge Per Bill ($) 62.5
Percent of Interchange Revenue if Using FSP's Credit Card 1.8%
Total Amount Paid Via BiliPay Per User Per Month ($) 87.51
Output BillPay Revenue Per User Per Month $) 3.375 c4*C
Annual BillPay Revenue Per User (FSP) ($) 40.5 C612
Note: in case of debit card, the rate of interchange revenue would be 0.894 so annual revenue would be $20.
52 EBP&P: Yodlee Leaps into Tough E-Billing Game. Ready?: Yodlee's BillDirect puts it in direct
competition with the likes of Wells Fargo, BofA and CheckFree. Some hail it as groundbreaking. Others
doubt its usefulness. US Banker, 113 (10): 17, October 2003. ISSN: 0148-8848
53 Yodlee BillPay brochure, http://corporate.yodlee.com/
54 Yodlee BillPay brochure, http://corporate.yodlee.com/
55 Definition of interchange fee and the approximate rate in the United States.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interchange_fee
Table 4-2: Yodlee's BillPay Annual Revenue Per User
A B C D
9 Comments
10i Inpat Charge Per User Per Month ($) 2.0
11 Outpat Annaal BiPay Revenue Per User (Yodlee) (S) 24.0 =c
FundsTransfer greatly boost customer activities on the website of FSP, resulting in
deeper relationships and higher retention. Also, it brings more deposit. According to
Yodlee, 70% of fund transfers are in-bound56 .
We can see Yodlee's strategy in developing these two products - to develop revenue
generating applications for FSPs. Compared with the products Yodlee provided in first
phase, obviously second phase products are more sustainable. Another big change in this
phase is that Yodlee partnered with major internet banking solution providers like S1.
Yodlee did this for two reasons: to integrate its own product into the entire online
banking solutions; to utilize the established delivery channels. This phase marked
Yodlee's transition from providing stand-alone solutions to providing a more integrated
solutions.
The third phase is after April, 2006. This phase is about product reorganization and
optimization. Many FSPs prefer in-house development, so Yodlee provides Software
Development Kit (SDK) tools. Also, Yodlee tried to integrate its product with more
partners to provide end-to-end solutions in a wide area. For example, Yodlee partnered
with EISI (www.eisi.com) to import aggregated financial information into EISI's
financial planning application. Equipped with Yodlee's aggregated account information
and EISI's financial planning functionalities, EISI financial professionals are able to
perform better services for their clients.
* EISI professionals understand their clients' financial situation thoroughly with the
access to clients' multiple accounts, and therefore can provide sound investment
suggestions.
* EISI professionals can present their clients more choices.
* The aggregated information facilitates better communication between EISI
professionals and their clients and makes real transactions more efficient.
In addition to abovementioned benefits, such kind of alliance creates value for Yodlee as
well. For example, even if Yodlee can develop similar products as EISI's, it takes long
time to develop the product and huge efforts to market the product. By bundling its
product with established companies like EISI, Yodlee can not only gain revenue from
sales or licensing, but also achieve bigger market share.
Aligning with its move towards better integration with third-party solution providers, in
this phase Yodlee focused on SDK, platform, and customer care development. In this
56 Yodlee FundsTransfer brochure, www.yodlee.com
way, Yodlee becomes a platform or at least a valuable interface for various software
vendors. Figure 4-3 depicts Yodlee's current solution portfolio57.
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Figure 4-3: Yodlee MoneyCenter
In fact, there are mixed development in each stage. For example, already in January,
2001, Yodlee partnered with WealthMetrics.com to rovide an integrated solution for
investment management and financial planning tool . The three-stage presentation just
gives an approximation of how Yodlee actually sees itself in the internet banking solution
market and how its strategy is formed and implemented.
In May, 2002, Yodlee tried to mine users' financial data 59, but it's not clear whether this
attemtt was successful or not. The author guesses that it was failed. 60 Several factors
might contribute to this failure. Firstly, banks were not happy about data mining because
of interest conflicts and security concern. Secondly, data mining requires big investment.
Table 4-3 summarizes the phases Yodlee experienced.
57 Yodlee MoneyCenter, http://corporate.yodlee.com/solutions/personal finance/yodlee moneycenter.htm
58 WealthMetrics.com and Yodlee form an alliance, Private Banker International: 3, January 16, 2001.
ISSN: 0953-7031
59 Screen Scraping, Part 2, American Banker, 167 (101): 1, May 28, 2002. ISSN: 0002-7561
60 The author can't find any coverage regarding the result of this effort. If it's an ongoing activity, Yodlee
must want to capitalize mining results, but there isn't this information in Yodlee's portfolio of products and
services.
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Table 4-3: Yodlee Business Development Phases
February, 1999
to
August, 2003
August, 2003
to
April, 2006
April, 2006 on
* Account Aggregation
(2000)
* Yodlee2Go (2000)
* Advisor Pro (2002)
, Bill Direct (2003)
* Card Direct (2003)
* AccountOpening,
FundTransfer (2005)
* MoneyCenter (2006)
* BillPay AccountAccelerator
(2006)
Various
security
companies
Billers,
S1,
Corrilian
EISI
* Licensing
* Per-user fee
* Licensing
a Per-user fee
* Shared revenue with Bank
from funds transfer
* Licensing fee from both
FSPs and internet banking
solution providers
* Per-user fee
* Shared revenue with Bank
from funds transfer
Besides dealing with various partners and clients, Yodlee needs to pay attention to value
conflicts between end users and FSPs. One product provided by Yodlee is BillPay
AccountAccelerator. With this product, customers can port their BillPay set-ups from one
FSP to another in just a few simple steps. Contents which can be ported include payee
information, payment schedules, and configurations. 61 Before this product, if users want
to switch between FSPs, they have to delete all billing information in one FSP and set up
the accounts manually in another FSP. Although Yodlee claims that this is a sticky
solution which helps FSP attract customers and retain them, obviously it decreases users'
switching cost between FSPs.
4.2.2 VerticalOne
VerticalOne was founded in 1998. It offered similar services as Yodlee - account
aggregation. VerticalOne was clearly a second player in this area. In February, 2000,
VerticalOne had 30,000 users62 (the merged company had 425,000 users).
Besides their similarity in products and services, Yodlee and VerticalOne developed their
businesses in similar way. VerticalOne struck deals mostly with portals, and later with to
61 http://corporate.yodlee.com/solutions/personal fmance/billpayaccountaccelerator.htm
62 Two More Sites Set to Add Account Aggregation, American Banker, 165 (40): 10, February 29, 2000.
ISSN: 0002-7561
banks. Moreover, VerticalOne also partnered with security companies to be compatible
with their softwares.
On the other hand, VerticalOne adopted a different approach on how they make money.
VerticalOne made money by attracting people to company Web sites. Discover Card, for
example, pays VerticalOne for the extra customers VerticalOne's service draws to its site.
VerticalOne also takes a cut of the ads sold on the Web pages containing the customer
account information63
VerticalOne was bought by S1 in September, 1999, for $163 million in stock, in the hope
that VerticalOne's product will complement S1's offerings in internet banking64. S1
didn't perform well during the next one to two years, and VerticalOne wasn't integrated
into Si 's product very well. In January 2001, S1 sold VerticalOne to Yodle.com, Inc. in a
stock-for-stock merge, with an approximate loss of $85.7 million. 65 The merger
reinforced Yodlee's leader position.
4.2.3 Comparison between VerticalOne and Yodlee
VerticalOne and Yodlee had exactly same products and same development trajectory
before their merge. Because the account aggregation was a new service, both of them
grew very rapidly. The problem of VerticalOne is that it was bought by S1 and was sold
only one year after the purchase due to the bad financial performance of S1.
4.3 The Competitive Horizon
4.3.1 Other Aggregators
In account aggregation area, Yodlee is the undisputed leader. For funds transfer,
CashEdge is much stronger because it entered the market much earlier and already
established partnership with many banks when Yodlee entered the market. For bill
payment and presentment, Yodlee faced competition from CheckFree and Metavante.
Yodlee charged $2 per user per month, while CheckFree and Metavante charged $4 -
$666. Similarly, CheckFree was already an established company when Yodlee entered the
market. Yodlee had its advantages from aggregated data and a large customer base. On
the other hand, the fact that Yodlee entered the market later than major competitors
63 Atlanta Company Tries to Make Personal Information on the Web Manageable, Atlanta Journal &
Constitution (GA), July 28, 1999. ISSN: 0093-1179
64 Security First to Buy Web Site Builder VerticalOne for $166 Million, American Banker, 164 (185): 18,
September 27, 1999. ISSN: 0002-7561
65 FORM 10-K, S1 CORPORATION 2000 annual report.
66 EBP&P: Yodlee Leaps into Tough E-Billing Game. Ready?: Yodlee's BillDirect puts it in direct
competition with the likes of Wells Fargo, BofA and CheckFree. Some hail it as groundbreaking. Others
doubt its usefulness. US Banker, 113 (10): 17, October 2003. ISSN: 0148-8848
places it in a disadvantaged position. For example, till now, Yodlee has only two bill
payment clients67
4.3.2 Competitors Who Are Not Information Aggregators
For online banking, other competitors include ERP vendors whose primary customer
segment is banking industry, and Internet-banking software provider.
For personal finance management, Yodlee competes with Intuit Quicken and Microsoft
Money. Table 4-4 compares functionalities of these three products. All the information is
from their product description. 68
Table 4-4: Comparison Among Quicken, MSN Money, and Yodlee
Download and track your
checking, savings and credit
card accounts - in one place
Create and follow a budget
Schedule payments and pay
bills right from Quicken
Verify accuracy of your bank
statements and avoid any
inappropriate fees or charges
Balance your checkbook
Download Transactions
Automatically track spending
Effortlessly keep your bills in
order
View charts and reports
Giving users one secure place
to manage their money and
bills
Automatically tracks
transactions from thousands of
held and held away financial
accounts and billers
Giving users one secure place
to manage their money and
bills
Gain insight into users'
personal financial picture,
including detailed charts that
reveal trends in savings,
spending, investments and
budget variance.
Automated spending and
transaction alerts give users a
constant view into their
financial affairs to help guard
67 http://corporate.yodlee.com/customers/consumers.html, there are more than a dozen of account
aggregation clients, while only two bill payment clients.
68 htt://www.microsoft.com/money/ProductDetails.aspx?pid=004&active tab=Compare,
http://quicken.intuit.com/personal-finance/basic-personal-budget.ihtml?lid=site banner,
http://corporate.vodlee.com/solutions/market research/Yodlee MoneyCenter 606.pdf
against fraud.
Simplify tax prep, find hidden Transfer data to tax
tax deductions and transfer preparation software
information directly to
TurboTax® software
There might be wording or product feature variances, but it's very clear that these three
products provide similar functionalities. While Yodlee can extract account information
on-the-fly, Quicken and Microsoft reply on downloading and importing bank statements
into their software, though it could be done automatically. Yodlee's service is free, but
users pay $19.99 for the most basic version of Microsoft Money and $29.99 for Quicken.
69 Besides the fee and product features, the competition is largely about number of FSPs
and billers each product supports. Also user base is very important since users usually
don't like to switch product once they are familiar with the one they are using.
4.4 Conclusion
Yodlee doesn't own relationship with end customers. The relationship remains in
aggregatees, namely FSPs and billers. End customers trust their service providers, and
always seek advices from them instead of from Yodlee.
As an aggregator, Yodlee aggregates many kinds of information, from account
information and bills to personal investment information. Yodlee has the data, but it's not
necessarily means that it owns the data, because FSPs and billers might set some
restrictions on how Yodlee can use the data. The author thinks Yodlee owns partial of the
data, that is, Yodlee owns end customers' overall financial situation, such as overall
savings, loans, investment, and net worth; Yodlee also owns information of end
customers' overall financial network, such as what relationship customers have with what
FSPs and billers. As the owner of these data, Yodlee has leverage in almost all businesses
which either produce these data or use these date as inputs. On the other hand, since
Yodlee only owns partial and the high level of these data, it becomes a supporting role in
almost all businesses other than its own core business - aggregation. For example, for
personal wealth management, Yodlee's data supports EISI core business - private wealth
management service.
Yodlee doesn't own transaction, either. Although Yodlee can gain some revenue from
transactions, like it has done in BillPay and FundTransfer, it's more like that Yodlee does
a good job in saving money by choosing least cost routine and get bonus from that, than
that Yodlee owns the transaction. Transaction remains in aggregatees - FSPs and billers.
Business models analysis in this industry is as follow:
69 http://www.microsoft.com/monev/ProductDetails.aspx?pid=004&active tab=Compare,
http://quicken.intuit.com/personal-finance/basic-personal-budget.ihtml?lid=site banner
o. Advertising - it is used by VerticalOne. But it's not major revenue, because the
financial products and services are not commodity. Usually account aggregation
service providers act as back-end, so advertising is not a choice at all. If in the future,
majority of end users register through account aggregators' websites instead of
through their FSPs, account aggregators can definitely employ advertising model by
providing information of interest rate, loan rate, and etc. But before that, aggregators
have to overcome the trust issue.
*. Brokerage - it's used by VerticalOne. No big revenue. Yodlee shares revenue with
FSPs through providing least cost routine for bill payment. Financial industry is a
highly regulated industry, the interchange and transaction fees are standard.
+ Subscription. It could be used by account aggregators since they clearly create value
for end users. In reality, it is not used by any account aggregator, because aggregators
want to build customer base. In the future, though, Yodlee may charge subscription
fee. Yodlee Terms of User says: Yodlee MoneyCenter tools and services are currently
free of charge. Yodlee reserves the right to charge fees for these services in the
future70 . There are at least two reasons that Yodlee might try this. Firstly, not all
major FSPs deploy Yodlee's product or similar product, while many end customers of
those FSPs want to use this kind of service. Secondly, by providing services directly
to end customers, Yodlee can free itself from difficult balance games it has to play
between FSPs and billers and end customers, such as in the case of BillPay
AccountAccelerator. Yodlee can develop two product lines, each for FSPs and end
customers separately. The product line for FSPs focuses on increasing stickiness of
FSP online banking, and the one for end customers focuses on increasing
convenience and choices. In adopting this approach, Yodlee has to be cautious
because it won't want to cannibalize its revenue from FSP. However, if there is big
customer base, it is worth trying. In this case, other business models such as
advertising and brokerage will also become possible.
o. Licensing - it's widely used in this industry. Because account aggregators are solution
providers; their products can be integrated into FSPs in-house solution and third party
products/services; it's very natural to develop licensing fee model. For example,
Yodlee charges up-front licensing fees ranging from $100,000 to $300,000 and a per-
user fee. 71
: Infomediary - Yodlee tried to mine customers' financial data, but it might be
unsuccessful because it only owns the data partially. If Yodlee starts to try
subscription model and becomes independent from FSPs and billers, and eventually
owns customer data entirely, it can consider this model. Before actual
70
https://monevcenter.yodlee.com/moneycenter/tnc.monevcenter.do?is popup= 1& flowld=tncFlow&c=csit
key%3AN%2FpPfhlB9FZg2JHR%2FDvEzcteixl%3D&l=is popup: flowld:u
71 First Union to Offer Aggregate Service to Show All Accounts, Charlotte Observer (NC), November 07,
2000
implementation, though, the customer base has to be big in order for the result to be
meaningful.
*, Referral/click-through. VerticalOne used this. VerticalOne and S1 didn't disclose
revenue from this. After Yodlee took over VerticalOne, though, it abandoned this
approach, replacing it with its own licensing model.
°* Professional service/consulting - Yodlee provides this service. For example, when
Fidelity developed in-house solutions, Yodlee provided this service.
+ Customized/personalized service - although it's used by account aggregators, it's
integrated into the entire solution. No extra charges are made because of this.
* Application service provider - Yodlee provides this service, 72 but most FSPs don't
adopt this approach. FSPs usually license a certain version of the product and
continue using it. One guess is that FSPs are concerned about security and stability
issue, so they would rather have the application run in their premises. If customers
use application service provider mode, the aggregation is done in Yodlee's data
center. If customers license one version and use it in-house, the aggregation is done in
their premises.
72 http://corporate.yodlee.com/technology/key_capabilities.html
5 Aggregatee Industry: Real Estate
5.1 Industry Overview
From April, 2005 to February, 2006, 15% of the active Intemet population visited a real
estate or apartment site, up 26% from a year earlier 73. Research shows that as many as
80% of consumers begin their search for property online. As more and more people use
the Internet as a tool for their property management, it's very natural that many real estate
companies provide services and information online, either to educate people or help them
acquire information.
The majority of real estate websites are operated by real estate companies or loan
companies. These websites provide home information, usually those listed for sale, for a
fee. Sometimes, the websites serve as interfaces to agents and brokers. In this case,
customers might get free information, after giving out their personal information such as
the location they live, their income, and their buy/sale intention.
The Internet also changes the way regional realtors do their businesses. For example,
more than half or the business of Corus Home Realty, which covers Washington and its
suburbs, comes in through the Internet. Most of the Internet businesses come through its
partnership with RealEstate.com and RealtyNow.com, and the rest from advertising links
on Google and Yahoo! 74
5.2 Zillow.com
Zillow was founded in February, 2006 by two former executives of Expedia - Richard
Barton and Lloyd Frink. Actually, before that, both were trying to buy homes for their
own families. Frustrated by huge efforts to find the right homes and the market value of
the homes they were interested in, the two started a website to display a vast amount of
homes nationwide, both on sale and not. The website not only provides basic home
information such as size, location, and price, but also provides high resolution maps and
the comparable homes in the same area. Best of all, all the information are free.
We've done the legwork for you by getting huge amounts of data from many sources and
creating something unique that the public sources don't provide - a Zestimate ofyour
home based on the public data75. This is Zillow's first blog, posted by the company's
CEO Rich Barton on February 7 th, 2006, to introduce the company's proprietary housing
estimation tool Zestimate. Interestingly, this description actually reflects three core
characteristics of information aggregation: collecting publicly published information
73Online Home-Hunting Gets More Sophisticated; A new site called Zillow allows consumers to find key
data about neighborhoods and calculate the value of their homes. Information week: NA, February 27,
2006
74 Online Home-Hunting Gets More Sophisticated; A new site called Zillow allows consumers to find key
data about neighborhoods and calculate the value of their homes. Information week: NA, February 27,
2006
75 http://www.zillow.com/howto/Zestimate.htm
from various sources, retrieving transparently, and providing unique value-added
services.
Zillow's logo is 'Your edge in real estate." The company's philosophy is that by
providing comprehensive housing information for free to various real estate stakeholders,
including buyers, sellers, owners, and professionals, it can attract big traffic, and
eventually attract advertisers. This is also clearly stated as Zillow's business model by its
CEO Richard Barton: I'd like to make a comment on our business model... Zillow.com
will make revenues from advertisements on the site. We will always be crystal clear about
what is content and what is advertising ... We see the process for buying and selling
homes as ... one that incorporates a huge amount of information... The company's
websites showcase this philosophy by putting advertisements at various noticeable spots
(see Figure 5-1 for an example).
E18 Ecdt ew I-45ty manarks Imols Help
oA~ -. ~ '--· r h . tt:l-htp/wwwziow.comlsearch/Search.htm?adrsrthood- 127+39th+Ave+E&dtystatezlp-Sea e 0 ii_ ___ __ '
dL r . '4 EN1 I 4 U.,f..
THI S URXSTEADS
11 New Home Communities
r GckrPu Swufrrfan$ te to~1.8 ilfem
7,. Zillow.com.'" Welcome! Please Sion In. New to Zillow? Register h.,
Your Edge in Reat Estate
Home Map & Search Post For Sale Real Estate Guide Discussions My Zillow
Find Homes 1127 9 s.at, WA 9112
4 1 - 7 ) of 7 results View: Street Aerial Hybrid O n Heat map
nor'thw+ t -n mec
Show home.
2 For Sale (5)
0] C Make Me Move (1)
1] Recently Sold (1)
0] All other homes
Price: Any
*Beds: Any
Baths: Any
1 Size: Any
1 Lot: Any
Type: Any
1 Sold within: Any
For Sale By: Any
Reset all selections
Trarsfnrri data from zestsl.zlow
Charmaine Gravning
Realtor, 206.354.7383
Visit my website
Advertise with EZ Ads
Figure 5-1: Zillow WebPage 1 (Map & Search)
Although Zillow's objective and business models are always clear and consistent as it
grows, it actually experienced several stages developing its capacity, both in contents and
in user experiences. The first stage is read-only website. In this stage, it provided home
information online; it also gave APIs to popular web portals such as Yahoo! for free. The
major objective of this phase is to get enough exposure in order to accumulate user base.
76 http://www.zillowblog.com/zillowblog/2006/02/were livewwwzi.html
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In second stage, it added write functionality by utilizing Web 2.0 mash-up capacity,
allowing home owners to claim their homes, edit home facts concerning home
improvement projects, and to alter home specifications. Both stages are about content
improvements. The third stage starts when Zillow allowed user to post and answer
questions regarding home facts. This stage is not only about content completeness, but
also about interactive communication, which drove Zillow along the way toward an
online community - one of Zillow's ultimate objectives. There is one same theme along
the different stages - improving user experiences. In order to achieve that, Zillow did
many nice jobs for various stakeholders; following are some examples:
o Make the site easy to navigate for all the stakeholders like buyers, sellers, and agents.
*o Put advertisement tag clearly on top of every advertisement.
° User can scale a map to a home, street, city, state, and the nation. The zoom in/out is
very fast and very intuitive.
+ Users can see the real estate heat map of 46 metropolitan areas nationwide. Heat map
uses different colors to indicate different levels of home unit price, making it much
easier for users to sense which neighborhoods are more or less expensive.
+ Display some interesting homes such as famous homes and scary homes to fulfill
people's interest in celebrity and unusual things.
* To build a popular online community, Zillow tried many methods to make the
website interactive. For example, the company set up its own blog; it created Q&A
page where agents, buyers, and sellers can communicate with each other; it launched
mobile feeds of home information;
* Launch Carnival of Real Estate, where real estate bloggers can communicate and
cooperate.77
: Provide as many homes as fast as possible. According to U.S. Census Bureau, there
were totally 124 million housing units nationwide in 2005.78 When Zillow launched
the website in early 2006, it had 60 million U.S. homes, about 48% of entire housing
units; and it hoped to have data on 110 million, roughly 89% of entire U.S. housing
units. 79
*° Provide as much home information. Zillow collects housing information from many
sources, including public records, recent sales, comparables, and tax information (see
Figure 5-2 for an example); the company even encourages its employees to solicit
77 http://www.zillow.com/corp/Timeline.htm
78 2005 American Housing Survey for the United States,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs05/tab1a7.html
79 Zillow.com reveals venture, Knight-Ridder Tribune Business News: NA, February 08, 2006
information from acquaintances. 8o Zillow then uses a complex algorithm to estimate
home value.
o Provide Zillow gadgets. For example, 'my net worth' is a gadget you can display on
your computer desktop, and it gives weekly and monthly changes of your home
value.
To conclude, Zillow strived to be a competitive content provider by offering as much
information in as many dimensions as possible; meanwhile, it strived to be a popular
virtual community website by offering excellent user experience. In return, Zillow
accumulated critical mass in a very short period. Here are some facts:
* House lists increased from 60 million to 70 million one year after the launch of the
website.
*. Started advertisement in April, 2007, and accumulated 3,000 advertisers within 6
weeks81.
o* Three to four million viewers per month, with eight pages per view82
Besides excellent content and user experience, Zillow's success also owed to the unique
way it collects source information. To start with, Zillow collected publicly available
information, as any aggregators have done. As the website traffic increases, though,
Zillow took an unusual move - asking viewers, especially home owners to contribute to
housing information. This move is very smart, because it at least brings in two benefits:
. Increased customer involvement. Deeper customer involvement with Zillow
community gives customers motivation to visit the site more and promote the site;
* Better differentiation from its competitors. Zillow becomes the original source of
some part of aggregated information, instead of retrieving everything from others.
This is very powerful because this can differentiate Zillow and increase the barrier for
others to compete with it.
While in previous two case studies of shipping and financial service, aggregated
information are totally from aggregatees, Zillow's information are from various sources.
Zillow collects on-sale home datas from real estate companies, both nationwide and
regional; it collects sale history and tax information from local governments (see Figure
5-2 for an example). The rest of the information is from either home owners or real estate
professionals, as mentioned above. On top of that, Zillow creates Zestimate, price trends
and comparison both community wide and state wide. Finally, Zillow combines all the
information with commercial maps software, such as Bird's Eye View data from
Microsoft Virtual Earth,83 and aerial, satellite, andparcel map data from GlobeXplorer 84
80 The mark of Zillow, Knight-Ridder Tribune Business News: NA, February 26, 2006
81 http://www.zillowblog.com/
82 Advertising on Zillow brochure, www.zillow.com
83 http://www.microsoft.com/virtualearth/default.mspx
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Figure 5-3: Zillow WebPage 2 (Home Details)
Real estate companies and local governments are aggregateees. For local governments, as
long as Zillow cites the online information without distorting, there should be no
problem, because the information is exactly for public welfare. For real estate companies,
however, their reactions are similar to those in shipping industry and financial service
industry. Zillow poses threat to professionals such as appraiser and agent, so it caused
some initial angst from the real estate community85. Newspapers, blogs, and real estate
trade journals have blasted the site for giving inaccurate information on homes, with
valuations as much as 20 percent above or below actual value.86 Zillow tried hard to
sooth the angst and to attract them to the website. For example, Zillow lists home-for-sale
for professionals for free. On the other hand, real estate professionals realize later or
sooner that the Internet as a tool is changing and will continue to change their way of
doing business. Just see how the Internet has changed the travel industry from a service-
oriented one to a self-service one. It's better for agents and professionals embrace this
challenge and opportunity instead of refusing it. Zillow provides platforms for them and
their customers by providing blog space called Real Estate Carnival, virtual community,
and a set of tools. There might be other websites provide similar platforms, but Zillow's
85 The mark of Zillow, Knight-Ridder Tribune Business News: NA, February 26, 2006
86 The mark of Zillow, Knight-Ridder Tribune Business News: NA, February 26, 2006
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big customer base, traffic, and popularity are definitely attractive when real estate
professionals think which websites they choose to work with.
Home owners in general are not aggregatees; they provide information directly to Zillow
through its interactive community tools. Home owners have motivation to provide Zillow
information. For example, they can use Zillow tools to arrive at the right selling prices
and to track their most important asset, for free. Many home owners are supportive and
active in Zillow community, although some home owners didn't like the business 87. As
all the case studies show, aggregatees are detached, if not hostile towards aggregators, so
the cooperation between Zillow and home owners becomes even more precious.
Actually, Zillow didn't do any official advertisement of its site; the rapid user and view
growth are mainly through Word of Mouth and news coverage, which proves Zillow's
popularity from another perspective.
If Zillow wants to stay neutral and prosper at the same time, it has to achieve good
relationships with multi players in this industry. Its strategy makes sure that it takes care
of interest of each party, either by provide real benefit, or by force them to join using
leverage gained from end customers.
Zillow's value to consumers is that it takes some power previously owned by real estate
professionals and gives it to buyers/sellers. Figure 5-4 illustrates the original relationship
vs. the changed relationship, with the width of arrows indicating the magnitude of the
relationships. Originally buyers and sellers don't have direct connection, they exchange
information and negotiate price through agents. With Zillow's interactive community
tools, buyers and sellers can communicate in many ways such as Q&A, owners posting
home photos, and owners altering home specifications. In most cases, agents still play an
important role in the final transaction (Zillow's CEO hired an agent to close his own
home sale deal88), but the power largely tilted towards buyers and sellers.
Figure 5-4: Zillow's Effect on Relationships between Agent, Buyer, and Owner
87 Arizona has a Zillow problem,
http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/monev/columns/article 1661439.php
Arizona bill paves way for Zillow to operate in state,
http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/venture/category.asp?blogID=14&category-496
88 My House is Pending, blog posted on 5/22/07,
http://www.zillowblog.com/zillow_blog/2007/05/my_house is pen.html
Originally, agents own relationship, data, and transaction, so they can influence buy/sell
decision, have market insight, and earn commissions. In afterward situation, comparable
data is accessible to every party, so every one has market insight and no one actually
owns the comparable data, but home owner owns home specific data. As to relationship,
because buyer and seller can communicate with each other and influence each other, so
home owner largely owns the relationship, at least in the early phase of buy/sell decision.
In later phase, however, if seller hires an agent, agent might influence the buy/sell
decision also. As shown in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2, by changing the ownership of
relationship and data, Zillow empowers buyer and sellers to make more informed
decision.
Table 5-1: Customer Assets Ownership (Originally)
Home owners
Appraiser
Agents Y
Part of data (owner's home
information)
Y
Y
Table 5-2: Customer Assets Ownership (Afterward)
Home Partly Part of data (owner's home Y(if owner sells the
owners information) home by itself)
Appraiser Part of data (if owner hires an
appraiser)
Agents Partly Part of data (owner's home Y (if owner hires an
information) (if owner hires an agent) agent)
Largely, Zillow works with Google to place AdSense contextual advertisement. Different
advertisements are placed on different pages based on the content of each page. The
advertisements comply with Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) standards . It also has
its own advertisement placement. One of its own advertisement endeavors is EZ Ads;
small businesses like agents and appraisers can use it to advertise on Zillow in a budget
and controllable way. EZ Ads works similar to Google's AdWords. Both provides very
simple on-line steps for advertisers to create how the advertisements look like and how
advertisers want their advertisements be broadcasted and what's the budget and duration
of the advertisements.
89 Zillow_media kit march_2007.pdf, www.zillow.com
Y
Table 5-2: Customer Assets Ownership (Afterward)
EZ Ads targets its audience based on customer preferences. Only relevant advertisements,
either regional wise, or activity wise, will be displayed on one user's view pages. For
example, if one user searches home in Cambridge, MA, with zip code 02139, only
advertisements of those agents and brokers who want their advertisements list in this
region will be displayed.
In one example, if put $100 as planned cost, duration as one month, and zip code as
02139, below results will show up:
2. Tell us how to run your ad
1 We are unable to show your ad more than 7,099 times in 1 month within the ZIP code(s) you selected, Please
choose a longer running period, or add more ZIP codes (as many as you want).
How much do you want to spend (total)?*
$ 100 .00 @ $0.01/ad shown = 10,000 showings
How long should the ad run (approximately)?*
O 1 week 1 month 0 3 months
Where do you want the ad to run?*
ZIP code(s): 02139 ] 02139
S61low
Figure 5-5: Zillow's EZ Ads
The system says 'We are unable to show your ad more than 7,099 times in I month
within the ZIP code(s) you selected. Please choose a longer running period, or add more
ZIP codes (as many as you want).'The example indicates that Zillow has statistics data
about traffic in each specific area, so it can estimate the advertisement effect.
As mentioned before, Zillow generates revenue solely from advertisements. Zillow
attracted affluent users who are actively in market. According to Zillow, it's one of the
most popular real estate sites on the Web; 46% of its users have annual household
incomes over $100,000; 89% own at least one home; 54% of are either actively buying
or selling, or plan to in the next 24 months90
For Google AdSense, in the case of CPC (cost per click), Google and Zillow share the
revenue once users click the advertisement. In case of CPM (cost per thousand
impressions), Google and Zillow share the revenue generated from advertisements
presence. Google's pricing algorithm is very complicated, depending on many elements
such as the quality of keywords and the performance of the advertisements 91. For EZ
Ads, it's possible to estate the revenue. Following facts are found on Zillow's website92:
90 Zillow_media_kit_march_2007.pdf, www.zillow.com
91 http://www.google.com/adwords/learningcenter/text/18719.html#ctx=tltp
92 www.zillow.com
o* Four million unique users per month
o Each user visits eight pages on average
. 1 penny per view per EZ Ads
Zillow places many advertisements at obvious spots on many popular web pages (see
Table 5-3 for overall situation and Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-3 for examples).
Table 5-3: Zillow's advertisements
Home
Map& search
Home Details
comparables
Birds
eyeview and
map
Post for Sale
Real Estate
Guide
MyZillow
help
Zestimate
www.zillow.com
http://www.zillow.com/search/Search.htm
?mode=browse
http://www.zillow.com/HomeDetails.htm?
zprop-48905201
http://www.zillow.com/search/Comparabl
es.htm?zpid=48905201
http://www.zillow.com/aerial/DualMapPa
ge.htm?zpid=48905201
http://www.zillow.com/postings/Postings.
htm
http://www.zillow.com/myzillow/Favorite
s.htm
http://www.zillow.com/howto/HowTo.ht
m
http://www.zillow.com/howto/Zestimate.h
tmin
1 top leaderboard
1 wide skyscraper
1 rectangle
1 bottom leaderboard
1 top leaderboard
1 wide skycrapper
2 rectangles
1 medium rectangle
1 top leaderboard
1 wide skyscraper
1 rectangle
1 top leaderboard
1 wide skyscraper
1 half skyscraper
0
1 top leaderboard
2 half skyscrppers
1 half wide skyscrapers
1 bottom leaderboard
1 top leaderboard
1 skyscrapper
1 bottom leaderboard
1 bottom leaderboard
1 skyscrapper
Local real http://www.zillow.com/local/Nevada/Clar 1 top leaderboard
estate k/Las%20Vegas 1 bottom leaderboard
1 sidescrapper
Good http://www.zillow.com/howto/GoodNeigh 1 sidescrapper
neighbor borPolicy.htm 1 top leaderboard
policy
To evaluate EZ Ads revenue, following assumptions are made.
+ only one out of eight pages display Zillow's EZ Ads
+ on average three EZ Ads per page
Zillow's annual revenue from EZ Ads would be $1,440,000.
Table 5-4: Zillow EZ Ads Revenue
A B C D
1 Comments
2 Number of Users Per Month 4,000,000
3 Number of Pages Visited Per User 8
4 Input Rate of Pages Displaying EZ Ads (among all the pages) 0.125
5 Number of EZ Ads Per Page 3
6 Revenue Per View Per EZ Ads ($) 0.01
7 Output Annual Revenue From EZ Ads 1,440,000 -C2*C3*C4*CS*C6*12
Besides EZ Ads, Zillow also does banner exchange, with a minimum expense of three
thousand dollars per month93 . In July, 2006, Zillow has about fifty direct advertisers94
The annual revenue of this part is about $1,800,000.
Table 5-5: Zillow Banner Exchange Revenue
A "' C D
10 Comments
11 Minimum Expense of Banner Exchange Per Month ($) 3,000 year 2006Input12 Number of Users 50
13 Output Annual Revenue From Banner Exchange 1,800,000 -12"C11*C12
Zillow also developed a set of APIs which can be used in web portals. Zillow doesn't
charge anything for this, though. Zillow promotes open API 95. The motivation behind this
is to improve exposure and traffic to the web site.
93 http://www.zillow.com/bannerads/GetStarted.htm
94 Zillow gets $2.5M more in venture capital, Knight-Ridder Tribune Business News: NA, July 25,2006
5.3 The Competitive Horizon
5.3.1 Other Aggregators
Before Zillow, there were already sites providing similar services. Most of the sites
focused on one or several specific areas, for example, PropertyShark.com focused on
New York, while Trulia.com focused on California. Moreover, registration and/or fee are
required to access home information. In contrast, Zillow provides nationwide homes
information, and for free.
After Zillow launched the website, however, some big established real estate companies
quickly threw out their own online tools. Within a month, Realtor.com had a new feature
on its front page to give consumers a starting point to assess their property values.
Another one, http:://www.realestate.com, owned by InterActiveCorp, has similar online
home valuations, and they have valuations for 97 million homes, 27 million more than
Zillow's. The ways these two companies give valuation are different. Zillow's Zestimate
gives a single number of the home value, while RealEstate gives a range and a median
value. For example, for one home whose address is 4017 252nd ave se, 98029, Zillow's
estimation is $541,168, and RealEstate's estimation is from $532,100 to $571,000 with
the median at $551,500, producing a 1.9% difference. Generally, difference between
these two estimations largely depends on the accuracy of each one. If comparable data of
the home of interest is abundant, for example, in metropolitan area, both estimations are
accurate and thus have little variation. If comparable data is scarce, whether it's because
the home of interest is in rural areas or because it is very expensive or very low-priced,
the evaluation will be very different. As to user interface, both are intuitive. The most
viewed pages of these two sites, maps and searches are strikingly similar (see Figure 5-6
and Figure 5-7). Trulia.com lists only on-sale houses, but it provides some nice features
such as the heat maps and average sale prices.
Figure 5-6: Zillow's WebPage 3(Home Details)
95 http://www.zillowblog.com/zillow_blog/api/index.html
Figure 5-7: RealEstate's Home Details Page
Although abovementioned companies provide similar information and tools to end users,
their revenue models are very different. Zillow makes money from advertisements, and
the real estate information, tools, and community serve as the platform to attract
customers and views. Other real estate companies mainly use websites as an interface to
attract customers to their actual revenue generating businesses, such as brokerage and
mortgage, though they might also place advertisements on their websites.
5.3.2 Competitors Who Are Not Information Aggregators
Because Zillow's sole target is online advertising, and provides all other services and
tools for free, only those companies who also publish real estate relevant advertisements
are Zillow's direct competitors. Besides abovementioned competitors, who are mainly
from the real estate industry, other online adverting publishers, especially those with
contextual adverting capacity are Zillow's major competitors.
For example, Google is a strong competitor. Google's AdWords Ads are displayed along
with search results on Google, while AdSense helps other website display relevant, text-
based advertisements. 96 The advantage of advertising with Google is Google's huge and
still growing ad network, while with Zillow, advertisers can access to a more focused
group since a large percent of Zillow's viewers are active buyers and sellers. Besides
competition, Zillow also cooperates with Google - Zillow is a user of Google's AdSense.
96 http://www.im4newbies.com/google-adwords-adsense-faq.htm
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As a result, some advertisements on Zillow's website come from Google, though it's only
text-based. In this situation, Google and Zillow share the revenue. It's hard to say which
one of advertising with Google and advertising with Zillow is more efficient. Some real
estate agents use Google's AdWords, but at the same time indicate preference of
placements on Zillow's website. 97 In 2006, brokers, agents and developers spend
upwards of $8 billion in advertising, and the percentage of that money spent on the
Internet will grow as time goes by.98 Despites of Google's ubiquity, Zillow might prosper
given the market growth and its unique attractiveness to advertisers due to its aggregated
information and its active communities.
5.4 Conclusion
Zillow made a success start and attracted big attention and advertisements. In this special
case, management team played a very important role since the two founders are Internet
veterans and have very good reputation in the capital market. However, it's still early to
predict the company's long-term performance. Whether the company can sustain depends
on several issues:
o Continue to be the unique value deliverer. In this aspect, realestate.com poses huge
threat to it because both provide similar services, but realesate.com has a much larger
home database. Zillow's chance is to make the content locally relevant. Since Zillow
has an active virtual community, something similar to open source software
community, it can leverage residents to achieve this goal.
o Improve the home valuation accuracy. In long run, become user's irreplaceable home
valuation website.
Business models analysis in this case is as follow:
* Advertising - currently it is Zillow's only revenue source. The revenue of advertising
depends on traffic, which Zillow has done a good job till now. But the future of the
company depends on the uniqueness of the value delivered by the company. Zillow
can also try targeted advertising more aggressively. For example, Zillow can target
advertisements based on income, family size, have kids or not, school preference,
traffic, and etc. Of course, this requires user to provide more information. If Zillow
can make users believe in the potential value and sign in, it ca definitely pursue in this
direction.
° Brokerage - it's not used by Zillow. Since Zillow wants to be completely on
customer's side, it actually has to be independent and neutral. On the other hand,
Zillow tried or actually recruited some Real Estate Brokers99, but the main motivation
is to be an insider of real estate, to access higher quality information. Zillow.com is
seeking to become a licensed broker in multiple states... We do not plan to be an
97 http://www.zillow.com/forum/site/ViewThread.htm?tid=568
98 What's your house really worth? Fortune Magazine, 2/15/2007
99 Zillow's career webpage, looking for Real Estate Broker in Hawaii
agent or act as an agent in any real estate transactions. As a licensed broker, we may
... remain current on the issues facing the local and national real estate community.
We may seek to enhance our Zestimate valuations...
o Subscription - it's not used by Zillow. Currently, users don't have to register with
Zillow to view home information. However, registered users have some functionality
which general users don't have. First, registered users can save their favorite homes
so that they can track those homes; second, registered users can claim to be home
owners once they provide relevant proof. Based on registration, Zillow can charge
fees. Currently, when users register with Zillow, the site actually only ask for some
very general information such as username, photos (optional), without asking any
specific information regarding income, home preference, and etc. After acquiring the
information, Zillow can either do targeted advertising more aggressively or provide
customized service and charge subscription.
o Licensing - it's not used by Zillow. Zillow does provide API to popular websites, but
Zillow's target is to get more people visit its website. Zillow has made it very clear
that they will only make money from advertisements.
: Infomediary - not used by Zillow.
* Referral/click-through - not used by Zillow. Although Zillow can try this, it's in
direct conflict with Zillow's philosophy: be customer's edge in real estate. So it's
unlikely that Zillow will collect referral/click-through fee.
*. Professional service/consulting - not used by Zillow. Real estate is a rather mature
industry, which has its own portfolio of professionals, including agent, appraiser, and
lenders. These professionals are well trained and the services they provided are highly
tailored. Zillow's strength is about information, but not about the trainings. Zillow's
overall analysis of real estate market, however, could be valuable. Before providing
this consulting service, Zillow has to improve accuracy of its estimation. Also, what
kind of customer would be interested in this consulting service is still a question.
+ Customized/personalized service - not used by Zillow. See analysis in 'subscription',
Zillow can do this in the future.
** Application service provider - not used by Zillow. One reason might be that
Zestimate is not very accurate, 7% above or below actual home value, 100 which in the
eye of Zillow, is the actual transaction price. 101 However, there is potential that
Zillow can gain revenue from it. Currently, Zillow provides APIs to web portals for
free in order to improve exposure and generate bigger traffic. Zillow can definitely
charge for this service once it has secured its leading position as a real estate content
provider.
Online Home-Hunting Gets More Sophisticated; Information Week: NA, February 27,2006
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Zillow can also try franchise. For example, there are plenty of small and specialized real
estate agents, Zillow can definitely provide services to them, and at the same time assign
its customers to those small agents. However, it's risky. Zillow's primary goal is to
benefit end customers, so it has to be very careful about the neutrality of the content it
provides. If Zillow takes this step, it has to make arrangement in order not to affect its
core business and revenue.
In an industry where information becomes more and more commoditized, there is no real
stickiness in content. How Zillow performs in user experience and delivering key value -
Zestimate are critical to the company's long term success.
Because of new technology and new tools, especially Web 2.0, it's very easy for one
company to imitate another one given enough money and talents. RealEstate's quick
move towards online house valuation is an example. However, if Zillow can build the
entry barrier by building large enough home database or build a large amount of loyal
user base, Zillow can still survive.
On the other hand, although home valuation seems to be a rather independent activity,
there are other activities in the integrated value chain, such as home loan. Realestate has a
better position in this aspect since its parent company - InterActiveCorp owns
lendingtree.com, a home loan website. They can integrate and optimize the ultimate value
presented to customers, just as in the previous two cases, to dramatically increase the
stickiness of relationship.
6 Conclusion
Chapter three to chapter five presents three case studies of information aggregators in
different industries. Although the cases are different from each other, they have
similarities. This chapter first summarizes the relationships between aggregatees and
aggregators and the relationships between aggregators and end users, and then goes
through business models proposed in chapter 2 to see how they are actually implemented
in real world, and finally predict the development direction of information aggregators.
6.1 Aggregatee vs. Aggregator
Generally, information aggregators are intruders to the aggregatee industries, at least in
the eyes of aggregatees. Aggregators collect publicly available information, mainly from
aggregatees. In this aspect, actually aggregatees have a better platform to do information
aggregation. So why don't aggregatees take the initiatives?
o. Aggregatees don't see the needs. According to E. Hippel, Aggregatees - usually
existing companies are in requirement sticky side, while customers are in needs sticky
side.' 02 Aggregatees are content with their own solutions and think customers will be
similarly satisfied with their services. For example, it's very natural for carriers such
as UPS to improve customer online experience by providing online information and
online tracking tools, but it takes intense brain work for UPS to conceive that
providing rival's information will please customers.
o. Aggregatees are not willing to disclose the information. Even when aggregatees think
of competition and want to be preemptive, they might hire consultant to do the market
research, but will then keep the information as secret. In other words, aggregatees
choose not to publicize the information, which is understandable because information
commoditization generally will reduce the overall margin of the industry.
o. Many aggregatees don't have the competences to implement the technical solution
required by information aggregation, at least in the early phase. For example,
Yodlee's account aggregation employs "screen scraping", a technique to extract data
from the human readable websites, usually not well structured. 'Screen scraping'
requires excellent understanding of HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) and
programming skills. It is also a labor intensive job, requiring constant modifications.
o Aggregation might cannibalize aggregatees' existing business. Besides
abovementioned overall margin erosion due to information commoditization,
aggregation might injure aggregatees' business in two specific ways. Firstly,
comparison aggregation might expose aggregatees' inefficiencies and thus cause
customer loss. Secondly, information aggregation may cause certain kinds of
product/services obsolete or less attractive. For example, in Zillow's case, real estate
agents become less powerful and eventually may earn less commission. Many real
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estate companies gain major revenue from commission sharing and list fee, so
introducing free online information aggregation will cut their own revenue.
Usually aggregatees resist aggregators in the first place. But the influence of aggregation
is strategic; an aggregatee will either utilize it or get hurt, so actually no aggregatee
ignores information aggregation. Aggregators and aggregatees can develop different
relationships. According to S. Madnick, the relationship could be independent,
partnership, and ownership (aggregators owned by one dominate aggregatee or a
consortium of aggregatees). 10 Besides these three relationships, the case study of Yodlee
indicates another state - aggregator being part of an end-to-end solution provider of
aggregatees. Table 6-1 summarizes the relationships and corresponding cases.
Table 6-1: Relationships between Aggregators and Aggregatees
Independent
Partnership
Ownership (Be part of
one aggregatee)
Be part of an
integrated solution
provider of
aggregatees
Intershipper, Zillow
Yodlee
iShip
Yodlee
Thinking of BillPay solution, there is a
partnership between Yodlee and FSPs.
Shopping-com being with eBay can also
be seen as this type.
Yodlee's partnership with S1 can be seen
as this type.
mySimon.com being with CNET can be
seen as this type.
Even there is cooperation and partnership between aggregators and aggregatees, it is
usually superficial. No deep relationships are developed between these two parties.
For information aggregators in a closed and concentrated industry, partnering with big
aggregatees is a key. On the other hand, if the information is commoditized and the
aggregatee industry is diversified, being an independent aggregator is a good choice. For
example, if Zillow accumulates big customer base and home information base, it can
definitely succeed without partnering with any real estate company.
6.2 Aggregator vs. End User
One question faces information aggregators is whether to charge end users. In all three
case studies, aggregators actually don't charge end users. The reason is that end users are
supporters and later the asset of the aggregators. Customer base is aggregators' bargain
103 S. Madnick, Seizing The Opportunity: Exploiting Web Aggregation, MIS Quarterly Executive 2002
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power with aggregatees. However, as aggregators have more power, they might as well
charge end users.
Sometimes the value proposition provided by aggregators to end users and to their clients
and aggregatees have conflict. On one hand, aggregators want to empower end users,
give them as much information, and enhance their experience. On the other hand,
aggregators have to bring value to instead of cannibalizing their clients and aggregatees.
Yodlee faced this kind of dilemma when it introduced BillPay AccountAccelerator (see
chapter 4). There is no easy way to balance such kind of interest conflicts. When
considering actual implementation, aggegators need to think about the gain and loss of
both short term and long term. They also need to think about their strategy. Whether they
are partnered with aggreagtees, such as iShip has done, or they are totally independent
and lean towards end users make a big difference.
6.3 Business Models
Some of the business models proposed in chapter two are widely adopted by information
aggregators, such as advertisement and licensing. Some are used by none of the
aggregators in case studies, such as infomediary. Table 6-2 summarizes the revenue
source and the examples of each business model.
Table 6-2: Business Model Summary
Advertising
Brokerage
Subscription
Licensing
Infomediary
Referral/Click-
through
Advertising
fees and list
fees
Transaction
fees
Subscription
fee
License fee
Sale of
consolidated
information
Lead referral
fees
* Traffic
* Uniqueness of aggregated
information
* Credibility
* Some industry requires
permit
* Advanced technology
* Customer service
* Standardized interface
* Partnership with key
players
* Completeness of data
* Structure of data
* Partnership
* Zillow.com
* shopping.com.
shopzila.com
* RedRoller
* VerticalOne
* iShip
* Yodlee
None
* shopping.com
* VerticalOne
* Red Roller
Customized/Person Service * User experience * iShip
alized Service charge
Professional Consulting * Talent * iShip
service/consulting fee * Ability to provide end-to-
end solution
Application Per-use or * Advanced product in * Yodlee provides
Service Provider annual/monthl aggregator side this capacity.
y fee * Trust from aggregatee side
One business model anticipated to be widely adopted while in reality not adopted by any
information aggregator is infomediary. Aggregators are in an ideal position to provide
answers to some questions such as what products and services work, and who opens what
accounts in which institution. Actually Yodlee tried to mine users' financial data but
didn't continue that effort. This business model was not implemented due to two major
reasons:
*. Aggregatees usually are cautious to include aggregators into their integrated solution.
The reason could be trust, interest conflict, and control over three customer assets:
relation, data, and transaction. Therefore, even aggregators usually have more data in
a wider breadth; they don't have relevant data in depth - the context of data, and thus
lose credibility.
* Most of the aggregators don't accumulate an exceedingly large user base. To provide
infomediary service, the amount of data has to be large in order to be objective and
meaningful. Even Zillow, who did a good job in this aspect, is far behind RealEstate
in the number of listed homes.
Zillow tries to move toward this direction by providing Zestimate and metropolitan home
value report. Although Zillow explicitly pointed out that their only revenue module will
be advertisement, as the accuracy of Zestimate and the number of listed home increase,
Zillow might want to generate revenue by selling the valuation report.
6.4 Prediction of Information Aggregators
We can see following trend in business models: (true in shipping industry and banking
industry)
* Standalone aggregation -> integrated into end-to-end solution
. Aggregation -> other customer valued products
Pure public information aggregation is a platform; company has to find out profit model
on top of it. To find the suitable business model, a company has to consider following
issues:
o The diversity of the industry where the aggregatees are in, measured by the
concentration ratio. 104 For example, although there are many shipping carriers, USPS
and UPS account for more than 85% of the entire E-Commerce shipping market (see
chapter 3), so shipping industry is a very concentrated one.
o Weight of information within the product/service. Does information play an
important role in products/services? How does information affect three customer
assets: relationship, data, and transaction? For example, for shipping industry, price is
just one factor, the location of stores, the frequency of pick-up and delivery, whether
it provides online tracking or not, and the quality of packaging and delivery are all
very important factors. Information itself only contributes to a small amount of the
entire solution. Also, the price are not transparent, especially for enterprise one.
By considering above two factors, aggregators can choose to be independent or partner
with aggregatees.
Figure 6-1: Independent vs. Partner Aggregators
If aggregatee industry is concentrated and the weight of information is small, it's better
for aggregators to partner with major aggregatees, through cooperation or ownership. For
example, as case study of shipping industry shows, giant carrier UPS doesn't allow
aggregators to compare its price with others, so comparison information of independent
aggregators such as Intershipper are not complete and become less attractive to users.
UPS also sabotaged iShip's businesses with MBE (see chapter 3) by leveraging its power.
But when UPS purchased iShip, it not only resumed iShips's business with MBE, but
also expanded iShip's service to its own branches.
104 The concentration ratio is the percentage of market share owned by the largest m firms in an industry,
where m is a specified number of firms, often 4. http://www.quickmba.com/econ/micro/indcon.shtml
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If the aggregatee industry is diversified and information plays a critical role within the
product/service, aggregators can survive and prosper being independent. For example,
Zillow retrieve information from a variety of real estate websites, both national ones and
regional ones, and local government websites. Although some real estate websites have
much wider coverage, no one can dominate others. Similarly, many shopping comparison
aggregators retrieve information from numerous online storefronts with no one dominate
others, so shopping comparison aggregators can be independent from aggregatees.
In addition, aggregators need to consider the trend of the aggrgatee industry? Is it toward
more on-line business? By considering this, aggregators can find out whether the entire
market size is increasing or not. Shopping comparison sites generally do well because the
online shopping and advertisements are increase dramatically, by seizing market share
from traditional channels.
Pure information aggregation is just a start point. In order to survive, aggregators have to
find revenue source. Because the entry barrier is low, after an information aggregator
entered the market, the first thing they should do is to increase the entry barrier by either
partner with traditional players, or by investing big money in technology, so that it can
differentiate itself. Companies failed to do so face big challenges.
Start Phase Expanding Phase
-Transparent, publicly available: -Find viable business models through
information try and error
- Multi-source information - Parter with aggregatees
- No need for partnership - Partner with other solution providers
- Easy to enter - Accumulate user base
- Easy to be copied - Enhance user experience
- Low initial competition
Established Phase
- Customerized information
- Integrated information/solution
- Big customer base/traffic
- Killer application
- Penetrate into traditional business
-Become source of at least one
essential information
Figure 6-2: Phases of Information Aggregator
In order for independent information aggregator to survive, following are some choices:
o* For a closed industry, try to complement offered value with its customer aggregatees.
° Enter into an expanding market, such as many of the shopping comparison sites.
° Differentiate itself either by partnership, or developing core technology, or being the
first mover and accumulate network effects. For example, Zillow has to differentiate
itself in order to survive after facing head-on competition from big players.
* Be sources of at least one type of aggregated information. Zillow achieved this to
some degree, although maybe unintentionally. Zillow asks viewers to contribute to
housing information (see 5.2), and these information becomes Zillow's uniqueness.
Although by doing this, Zillow is not a 100 percent information aggregator anymore
(see information aggregator definition in chapter 1), the initiative is very smart and
worth other aggregators considering.
Another strategy employed by early information aggregators is to leverage their
information aggregation capacity to pentrate into traditional businesses. CTrip and
Exedia have done this successfully.
CTrip was founded in 1998 by the company's CEO Jianzhang Liang, a Chinese internet
veteran. The first intention of the company is to present collected travel information,
attract big traffic and them make money from advertisements. This concept helped the
company attract big amount of venture capital. However, after several years of operating,
the company didn't achieve good revenue. The company then changed their business
model by break into traditional travel services such as hotel reservation and airline tickets
reservation. During this course, the company partnered with or acquired some traditional
travel call centers and agents. According to the company's CEO, CTrip is not a dotcom
any more, but a traditional travel service provider, using the Internet as a tool to facilitate
traditional businesses. Till now, hotel reservation and air tickets reservation are two
biggest revenue source of the company. The company went public to NASDAQ in
December, 2003, and now reached annual revenue of $100 million. If the company had
never been an information aggregator, it's hard for it to break into travel service industry
because there are many regional agents who have strong relationships with local
government, hotels, and airline companies. On the other hand, if the company stuck to
pure information aggregation, it wouldn't become the leading online travel service
provider in China.
7 Appendix
Appendix 1: Shopping cart software programs InterShipper integrates
Intershipper can be integrated with many of the popular shopping cart software programs.
Below is a list of the vendors who have integrated our services.
CFWebStore
Click Cart Pro
Comersus
CoolerBiz
eCatalogBuilder
LiteCommerce
PageDown Tech
ServerLogic
Shop-Script
Stingray Internet
Sun Shop
u$torekeeper Onl
VPASP
X-Cart
World Design GC
Communications
ine Shopping System
105 http://www.intershipper.com/Shipping/Intershipper/Website/MainPage.jsp?Page=Integrate
Appendix 2: Intershipper Revenue vs. Expense 1997 - 2006
Year Revenue Expenses Net Income
1997 $ 5,415.00 $ 189,877.00 $(184,462.00)
1998 $ 302,715.00 $(302,715.00)
1999 $ 553,694.00 $(553,694.00)
2000 $ 194,237.00 $(194,237.00)
2001 $ 15,910.00 $ 756,969.00 $(741,059.00)
2002 $ 7,642.00 $ 804,423.00 $(796,781.00)
2003 $ 3,637.00 $ 257,530.00 $(253,893.00)
2004 $ 25,063.00 $ 138,358.00 $(113,295.00)
2005 $ 34,547.00 $ 145,129.00 $(110,582.00)
2006 $ 56,553.00 $ 111,160.00 $ (54,607.00)
Appendix 3: Account Aggregation Service Adoption Data
1/31/2000
8/1/2000
8/16/2000
12/5/2000
1/1/2001
2/26/2001
5/26/2001
5/28/2002
9/17/2002
11/19/2002
12/16/2002
3/28/2003
8/11/2003
Oct-03
9/28/2005
Jan-07
425,000
800,000
1,350,000
3,000,000
3,300,000
6,000,000
88
140
150
150
1100
1500
2100
7000
8000
121
2500
2940
merge with VerticalOne
14 of top 20 banks
60% source screen scraping,
40% source something like OFX
launched advisor pro
10% of U.S. banks now offer
aggregation
bill presenting, not bill pay
30 of the top 50 global financial
institutions.
Checkfree only has 280 billers
Appendix 4: My own experience with MyPortfolio of Bank of America
I signed in MyPortfolio in Bank of America in February, 2007. I have following
experience and feelings:
o Sometimes, BoA's own data is not updated for at least one week.
°* Account information from other sources is updated every time I logged in. note
Some web sites such as OMEGA Financial, MIT FCU can't be integrated even currently
Yodlee can aggregate from more than 8,000 sites.
Note: according to Yodlee, Yodlee's Data Engine has sophisticated scheduling rules that
enable it to efficiently and automatically update data even when the user is offline so that
the customers access current account data every time they log in. 106
106 http://corporate.yodlee.com/technology/key_capabilities.html
